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NOTES

The Supreme Court’s Post-9/11
War-on-Terror Jurisprudence
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS, THRESHOLD
DETERMINATIONS, AND ANTICIPATORY REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Should a federal court ever overlook traditional
jurisdictional requirements in determining whether to review
on the merits a federal habeas challenge waged by an alleged
enemy combatant detained in the midst of the so-called war
on terror? What if extraordinary, exceptional, or unique
circumstances surround such a detainee challenge?1 What if
the challenge epitomizes a profound debate between personal
liberty and national security or otherwise invokes a significant
public interest?2 What if an executive actor has overseen the
military detention of an alleged combatant (perhaps an
American citizen) to an unprecedented extent and has even
caused the removal of this person from the civilian justice
system?3 What if this detainee denied all wrongdoing but has
been held without access to counsel or meaningful judicial
access for two years?4 Three years? Four years? What if the
detainee has been held not in the United States itself, but in a
territory controlled by the United States for all practical

1
See infra Part I.A-B. Within this Note, the term “detainee challenge” refers
generally to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus raised by or on behalf of a person or
group of persons detained militarily by the federal government.
2
See infra Part I.A-B; see also infra Part I.D.
3
See infra Part I.A.
4
See infra Part I.B; see also infra Part I.D.
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purposes?5 Are any of these scenarios special enough to justify
immediate review of the corresponding claims?
A closely related issue is whether a court should review
on the merits a detainee challenge, or elements therein, that is
based on reasonably foreseeable but only partially developed
circumstances.6 One possible future scenario is perpetual (that
is, effectively lifelong) detention given that the war on terror
has no foreseeable endpoint and could potentially span
multiple generations.7 Another, more immediate, prospect
relates to the trial of detainees by Executive-established
military commissions that may implement illegal procedures or
that are minimally subject to judicial review by Article III (that
is, civilian) courts.8 The question thus becomes whether courts
should expedite review to accommodate these hypothetical
(though anticipatable) controversies due to the major personal
liberties and constitutional issues at stake.9 Or, should courts
instead take more of a wait-and-see approach to delay
addressing arguably novel legal issues or unprecedented
factual scenarios until they are concretely presented?10
This Note will examine these two groups of questions as
they pertain to the four war-on-terror detainee challenges
heard by the U.S. Supreme Court in the five years following
September 11, 2001. These cases are Rumsfeld v. Padilla,11
Rasul v. Bush,12 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,13 and Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld.14 Padilla (in particular) and Hamdi (to a more
5

See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.C-D.
7
See infra Part I.C; infra note 195 and accompanying text.
8
See infra Part I.D.
9
See infra Part I.D; see also infra Part I.A, C.
10
See infra Part I.C-D.
11
542 U.S. 426 (2004).
12
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
13
542 U.S. 507 (2004). Note that Padilla, Rasul, and Hamdi were all decided
on June 28, 2004. In light of this, it may be appropriate to refer to them as sister cases,
even if they often do not see eye to eye. This Note will chronologically order and refer to
them per their placements in the Supreme Court Reporter. This is mostly a matter of
convenience, for there does not appear to be a necessary, definitive ordering of these
cases for purposes of the Supreme Court’s post-9/11, war-on-terror jurisprudence. But
the fact that these cases were decided on the same day underscores their
inconsistencies as a group in that these inconsistencies cannot be explained away by
virtue of being decided at different times.
14
126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). It appears that Boumediene v. Bush will be the fifth
case in this line. See infra note 104. Oral arguments have started in this case, but a
decision may not be handed down for some time. See id.
This Note acknowledges from the outset that there are far too many issues
related to these cases (and, more generally, the legal implications of the war on terror)
6
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qualified extent) advocate for judicial restraint in response to
questions such as those posed above, thereby supporting
resolution of threshold issues in accordance with narrow,
readily accessible criteria.15 By contrast, Rasul and Hamdan,
at least implicitly, prove more willing to consider less tangible
factors, including the relative equities of a habeas challenge,
in determining whether to review such cases on their merits.16
This Note will seek to show that these discrepancies contribute
to an unreliable and unstable line of precedent in the Court’s
post-9/11 war-on-terror jurisprudence and that this effect
exacerbates the political and judicial contention already
consuming the subject.
This Note will further criticize the Court’s emerging
tendency,17 as evidenced by Rasul and Hamdan, to incorporate
indirectly the merits of a detainee challenge, including any
arguably unusual underlying or surrounding circumstances,
within a jurisdictional or other threshold determination.18
More specifically, in these cases, the Court invoked the
purportedly extraordinary nature of the respective detainee
challenges in order to reinforce, justify, or defend purportedly
strict, formal threshold determinations prerequisite to a
review on the merits.19 The merits of these cases, as such,
appeared to creep into preliminary determinations of whether
to review these very same merits, but without any clear or
meaningful delineation. In addition to this conflation of
substantive attributes and threshold determinations, the
structure and content of these opinions makes it difficult to
determine whether certain, seemingly merits-based conclusions
functioned only as dicta (that is, additional non-binding
points) or were effectively collapsed into the primary threshold

for this Note to discuss in depth or even address at all. Not surprisingly, there already
is a substantial body of “war-on-terror” scholarship, entailing a wide variety of
approaches and opinions. Alas, due to practical constraints, this Note will only be able
to cite a small slice of this literature.
15
See infra Parts II.A, III.A. For an explanation of the parenthetical
qualification regarding Hamdi, see infra note 74 and accompanying text.
16
See infra Parts II.B.2-3, III.B.2.a-b.
17
But, at the same time, this Note still recognizes the overall instability of
these detainee cases as a group.
18
See infra Parts II.B, III.B.
19
See infra Parts II.B, III.B. In a related manner, Hamdan also exemplifies
an inclination to apply a relatively expansive temporal vantage point to resolving
detainee challenges when the treatment of detainees implicates substantial liberty
interests or raises far-reaching legal questions. See infra Part III.B.
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analyses.20 These overlapping characteristics may be identified
respectively as merits-creep and dicta-creep.21
Part I of this Note will provide an overview of the four
detainee challenges heard by the Supreme Court since 9/11.22
Part II will discuss in detail Padilla and Rasul regarding
whether (or to what extent) a federal court should consider the
merits or exceptional features of a detainee challenge in
assessing jurisdiction. Part II will also compare these cases to
Hamdi and Hamdan in relation to how narrowly or
expansively threshold issues should be reviewed. Part III,
which will elaborate more on Hamdi and Hamdan, will
examine whether federal courts should review claims premised
on circumstances that are still forming but are reasonably
20

See infra Parts II.B.2-3, III.B.2.a-b. For an expanded discussion on dicta,
see Hon. Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249 (2006). According to Judge Leval:
[D]icta often serve extremely valuable purposes. They can help clarify a
complicated subject. They can assist future courts to reach sensible, wellreasoned results. They can help lawyers and society to predict the future
course of the court’s rulings. They can guide future courts to adopt fair and
efficient procedures. What is problematic is not the utterance of dicta, but the
failure to distinguish between holding and dictum.
Id. at 1253. Leval, in short, advocates for the “careful use of dictum in judicial
opinions.” Id. (emphasis added). For an example of a federal case taking to heart
Leval’s “dicta about dicta,” by clearly delineating between holding and dictum, see Fox
TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 462 n.12. (2d Cir. 2007) (“We recognize that
what follows is dicta . . . .”) (discussing potential constitutional challenges to the FCC
indecency regime after invalidating it on administrative grounds). Interestingly, Leval
wrote a dissenting opinion in this case in which he “express[ed] neither agreement nor
disagreement with [the court’s] added discussion,” and noted that “the respect accorded
to dictum depends on its persuasive force and not on the fact that it appears in a court
opinion.” Id. at 474 n.19 (Leval, J., dissenting).
21
These terms are used to describe trends in the war-on-terror jurisprudence
that are otherwise difficult to articulate concisely; perhaps they should not be regarded
as having independent significance. The author is unaware of other instances where
these exact terms have been used.
Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives,
explored the notion of “creep” in a very different sense, but also within the context of
national security and the war on terror. See Newt Gingrich, The Policies of War;
Refocus the Mission, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 18, 2003, available at http://www.newt.org/
backpage.asp?art=993 (“Congress must act now to rein in the Patriot Act, limit its use
to national security concerns and prevent it from developing ‘mission creep’ into areas
outside of national security.” (referring to Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001
(“USA PATRIOT Act”), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)) (emphasis added)).
Mission creep is defined by one dictionary as “the gradual process by which a campaign
or mission’s objectives change over time, esp. with undesirable consequences.” See
Webster’s New Millennium Dictionary of English, Preview Edition (v 0.9.7 2008),
available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Mission%20creep (last visited Oct.
10, 2007).
22
See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
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likely to come to pass in the future.23 Part IV will conclude that
the Court should reverse the overreaching course set by Rasul
and Hamdan due to the difficulties intrinsic to determining
what constitutes special circumstances, let alone whether such
circumstances are special enough to justify departure from
basic threshold rules.
I.

THE POST-9/11 DETAINEE CHALLENGES: FACTS AND
HOLDINGS

Since 9/11, the Supreme Court has heard four federal
habeas petitions raised by alleged enemy combatants detained
outside of the civilian criminal system in the context of the war
on terror.24 These cases entail various factual scenarios: an
American citizen captured on U.S. soil and detained in the
United States;25 an American citizen captured in Afghanistan
following the American invasion there in October 2001 and
subsequently detained in the United States;26 and non-citizens
captured in Afghanistan and detained at the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Brig.27 The detainees in these cases challenged either the
circumstances of their confinement or the nature of the judicial
process they received or were set to receive.28 From these four
cases emerged an inconsistent line of precedent with regard to
the appropriate connection between the substantive attributes
of a detainee challenge and threshold determinations as well as
the scope of review warranted under the various circumstances
of these cases.

23
Part III will link to Part II to the extent that the decision to prospectively
analyze a detainee challenge turns on the merits of that case or the personal liberties
at stake.
24
See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
25
Padilla, 542 U.S. at 430-31.
26
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
27
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470-71.
28
The Court, however, directly reviewed the merits of only two of these
challenges: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. See infra Part I.C & I.D. By
contrast, Padilla v. Rumsfeld dealt exclusively with jurisdictional issues, see infra Part
I.A, as did Rasul v. Bush, at least as a formal matter. See infra Part I.B.
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A.

Rumsfeld v. Padilla: The First Post-9/11 Detainee
Challenge

In Rumsfeld v. Padilla29 (unlike in Rasul v. Bush30 or
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld31), the Court explicitly declined to
consider the special circumstances surrounding a detainee
challenge in determining whether the detainee had satisfied
threshold requirements necessary to its review of the merits.32
Stated differently, the Court refused to overlook traditional
jurisdictional requirements to address the profound debate
between national security and personal liberties (potentially)
presented by this challenge.33 Instead, the Court proceeded to
review threshold issues on a narrow level and to assign the
greatest legal relevance to readily accessible facts and
circumstances.34
1. The Facts of Rumsfeld v. Padilla
Jose Padilla, an American citizen, allegedly conspired
with al Qaeda in Afghanistan to execute terrorist attacks
against the United States.35 In May 2002, federal agents
detained Padilla at Chicago O’Hare International Airport after
he flew in from Pakistan.36 Padilla initially was held in federal
criminal custody in the Southern District of New York.37
Subsequently, pursuant to a presidential order stating that
Padilla was an enemy combatant,38 he was taken into custody
by the Department of Defense and relocated to a naval brig in

29

542 U.S. 426 (2004).
See infra Part I.B.
31
See infra Part I.C.
32
See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 447-51.
33
See id. at 450-51.
34
See infra Part II.A.
35
Padilla, 542 U.S. at 430-31.
36
Id. at 430.
37
Id. at 431.
38
Presidential Order to The Secretary of Defense (June 9, 2002). In making
this order, the President relied in part on the Authorization for Use of Military Force
Joint Resolution (“AUMF”). See id. (referring to Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(authorizing the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States . . . .” )).
30
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South Carolina under the oversight of Commander Melanie
Marr.39
Two days after Padilla was relocated, Padilla’s counsel
filed a federal habeas petition on his behalf in the Southern
District of New York, naming as custodians Secretary of State
Donald Rumsfeld, Commander Marr, and President George W.
Bush.40 The petition alleged that Padilla’s detention violated
several constitutional provisions, including the Sixth Amendment and the Suspension Clause.41
2. The Holdings of the Padilla Court
Reversing the lower courts, a majority of the Padilla
Court held that, in accordance with traditional habeas
jurisdictional requirements, Padilla’s (proper) immediate
custodian was Commander Marr, not Secretary Rumsfeld, and
the Southern District of New York did not have jurisdiction
over Marr.42 As a result, the Southern District lacked
39

Padilla, 542 U.S. at 431-32.
Id. at 432. Early in the litigation, the District Court, Southern District of
New York, dismissed President Bush as a respondent. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v.
Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he President should be dismissed
as a party [because] Padilla does not seem to be seeking relief from the President” and
because “the question of whether the President can be sued in this case raises issues
this court should avoid if at all possible, and it is certainly possible to avoid them
here.”). It does not appear that this ruling was challenged by any party to this case.
41
Padilla, 542 U.S. at 432. The district court had held that Secretary
Rumsfeld, but not Commander Marr, was the proper respondent, Padilla, F. Supp. 2d
at 578, and that the court had jurisdiction over Rumsfeld via New York’s long-arm
statute. Id. at 587. But on the merits the court held that the President had authority to
detain as enemy combatants American citizens captured in the United States. Id. at
587-89. The Court of Appeals, Second Circuit affirmed the jurisdictional holdings of the
district court, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003), but ruled that the
President was not authorized to detain Padilla militarily on either a statutory or
constitutional basis. Id.
42
The Court identified a pair of jurisdictional requirements that it deemed
controlling in this case: the “immediate custodian” and “district of confinement” rules.
Id. at 435-36, 442; see also infra note 45. The immediate custodian rule requires that a
habeas petitioner name as his custodian the “warden of the facility where the prisoner
is being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official.”
Padilla, 542 U.S. at 434-35 (citing Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885)
(interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2242(a) (stating that “the person who has custody” over the
petitioner is the proper respondent))). Notwithstanding any personal involvement
Secretary of State Rumsfeld may have had in the removal of Padilla from the civilian
criminal system and relocation to a military facility, Rumsfeld did not qualify as the
immediate custodian. Id. at 441-42. Commander Marr, not Rumsfeld, directly oversaw
the military brig where Padilla was detained and therefore was the proper respondent
in this case. Id. at 436.
The district of confinement rule, the second jurisdictional requirement,
simply requires that the petitioner file his habeas challenge in the district where he
was confined at the time of filing. Id. at 442 (citing Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S.
40
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jurisdiction over Padilla’s habeas challenge.43 The Court
therefore declined to review the merits of the case and
remanded for dismissal, but without prejudice.44
611, 617 (1961) (interpreting the phase “within their respective jurisdictions” to mean
that habeas relief may only be granted in the district in which the petitioner is
confined (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)))). Padilla’s petition did not satisfy this rule,
because it had been filed in the Southern District after, not before, the removal of
Padilla from this district. See id. at 432, 445. Although the Court had previously
interpreted the habeas statute as requiring “nothing more than that the court issuing
the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian,” id. at 442 (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial
Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973)), in core habeas cases such as this, see
infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text, “the district of confinement [was]
synonymous with the district court that ha[d] territorial jurisdiction over the proper
respondent.” Padilla, 542 U.S. at 444. Padilla, in other words, should have filed in
South Carolina, where both he and his immediate custodian (the proper respondent)
were located. See id. at 446.
43
Padilla, 542 U.S. at 451.
44
Id. at 430, 451. Justice Stevens dissented, see infra note 145, and Justice
Kennedy, in a relatively brief concurrence, explained why the Court should have
focused on “personal jurisdiction or venue” in resolving the dispute. Padilla, 542 U.S.
at 451-52 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Subsequent to this decision, Padilla filed a habeas petition in the District
Court, District of South Carolina. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D. S.C. 2005),
rev’d, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006). The district court
granted the petition on February 28, 2005, id. at 692, but the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed, Padilla v. Hanft 423 F.3d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006), holding that the government could indefinitely detain
Padilla militarily as an enemy combatant pursuant to the AUMF. Id. at 389, 392
(Padilla’s “military detention as an enemy combatant by the President is
unquestionably authorized by the AUMF as a fundamental incident to the President’s
prosecution of the war against al Qaeda in Afghanistan,” considering that Padilla “took
up arms on behalf of [al Qaeda] and against our country . . . and . . . thereafter traveled
to the United States for the avowed purpose of further prosecuting that war on
American soil . . . .”); see also Ronald D. Rotunda, The Detainee Cases of 2004 and 2006
and Their Aftermath, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 21-28 (2006) (discussing hypothetically
how the Supreme Court would have approached the merits of Padilla in light of the
plurality opinion in Hamdi).
On November 22, 2005, the federal government finally brought charges
against Padilla—including conspiracy to murder—and transferred him from military to
civilian custody. CNN-Law Center, Terror Suspect Padilla charged, CNN.com, Nov. 22,
2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/11/22/padilla.case/index.html. See Robert M.
Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of
Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 470-71 (2007) (discussing how
allegations of Padilla in civilian context lacked the “dramatic” edge of those raised
during Padilla’s military confinement); see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld: the Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 92 (2006) (noting
that the indictment against Padilla was viewed as an affront against federal courts);
Fred Barbash, Padilla’s Lawyers Suggest Indictment Helps Government Avoid Court
Fight, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/22/AR2005112201061.html (discussing the judicial
avoidance strategy of the government, considering that the timing of the indictment
was just days before the government was scheduled to reply to Padilla’s Supreme Court
appeal); supra note 39. Previously, Padilla had petitioned for writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court to challenge the ruling of the Fourth Circuit, see Padilla, 423 F.3d at
389, but the Court denied his petition in light of the intervening events described
above. See Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1063-64 (2006). Padilla’s claims, in short,
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In arriving at this holding, the Court emphasized that
the immediate custodian and district of confinement rules were
defaults applicable to typical habeas petitions like Padilla’s,
which challenged present physical custody within the United
States.45 The Court focused on whether basic jurisdictional
rules applied based on the presence of “core” circumstances,
especially present physical confinement, as opposed to the
absence of any arguably unusual circumstances.46 It therefore
found that the core nature of Padilla’s petition remained intact
despite any unique characteristics of Padilla’s confinement.47 In
sum, at least for threshold jurisdictional purposes, a habeas
petition involving an American citizen detained militarily as
part of the war on terror could be described as “typical.”48
B.

Rasul v. Bush: The Second Post-9/11 Detainee
Challenge

In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court diverged from the
principle espoused in Rumsfeld v. Padilla that special
circumstances should not affect the jurisdictional standing of
habeas petitioners, even those alleged to be enemy
combatants.49 In a manner somewhat comparable to the
majority in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,50 the Rasul Court appeared
to condone invoking the merits of a detainee challenge to
reinforce and justify formal threshold conclusions.51 Rasul thus

rested on a presently hypothetical state of affairs. See infra note 186. A federal jury
trial commenced in May 2007, MiamiHerald.com, Timeline: The Jose Padilla Case,
http://www.miamiherald.com/multimedia/news/padilla/ (follow “2007” hyperlink) (last
visited Oct. 5, 2007), and on August 16, 2007, Padilla was convicted of terrorismrelated conspiracy charges “after little more than a day of [jury] deliberation.”
Abby Goodnough & Scott Shane, Padilla Is Guilty on All Charges in Terror Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/17/us/
17padilla.html. Padilla is scheduled to be sentenced in January 2008. Jay Weaver,
Padilla Sentencing Hearing Postponed, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 4, 2007.
45
See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 446-47; see also supra note 42 and accompanying
text. The immediate custodian and district of confinement rules, according to the
Court, together “compose[d] a simple rule” that “[w]henever a § 2241 habeas petitioner
[even one held in military detention] seeks to challenge his present physical custody
within the United States, he should name his warden as respondent and file the
petition in the district of confinement.” Padilla, 542 U.S. at 447 (referring to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241).
46
Padilla, 542 U.S. at 449-50.
47
Id. at 441-42.
48
See id. at 451.
49
See supra notes 45-48.
50
See infra Part III.B.2.a-b.
51
See infra Part II.B.
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introduced confusion to the Court’s post-9/11 war-on-terror
jurisprudence regarding the appropriate degree of separation
between threshold determinations and the substantive
attributes of a detainee challenge.
1. The Facts of Rasul v. Bush
Rasul involved the consolidated claims of two
Australian and twelve Kuwaiti citizens who allegedly fought
alongside the Taliban following the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan in October 2001 and who were captured during
related hostilities.52 From early 2002, the U.S. military held
these fourteen persons at the Guantanamo Bay naval base,
along with over 600 other non-Americans captured abroad.53
The Rasul detainees, all of whom denied any connection
to the Taliban or involvement in terrorist activity, were not
charged with any crimes or provided with access to counsel.54
They filed habeas petitions in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, seeking various forms of relief
ranging from release from custody to access to the judicial
process.55 The district court dismissed these claims for want of
jurisdiction,56 and the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed.57
2. The Holding of the Rasul Court
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, holding
that federal district courts have jurisdiction over habeas
petitions raised by non-citizens captured abroad and detained
at Guantanamo Bay58 per the applicable federal habeas
52

Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470-71 (2004).
Id. at 471.
54
Id. at 471-72.
55
Id. at 472-73.
56
Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 68 (D.D.C. 2002) (“aliens detained
outside the sovereign territory of the United States” may not “petition for a writ of
habeas corpus” (referring to Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950))).
57
Al Odah v. U.S., 321 F.3d 1134, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Under Eisentrager,
“‘the privilege of litigation’ does not extend to aliens in military custody who have no
presence in ‘any territory over which the United States is sovereign.’” (citing Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-78 (1950))).
58
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483-84. This decision has been riddled with controversy
with regards to proper interpretation and scope of application. The text accompanying
this footnote presents one, but not the only, plausible reading of the majority opinion of
Rasul. See supra Part II.B. As described in one article, the Rasul Court “failed to make
clear whether its rationale was limited to Guantanamo Bay or instead implied that
53
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statute59 and in light of relevant Supreme Court precedent
interpreting this statute.60 The Court remanded the case to the
district court for review on the merits.61
In its analysis, the Court first noted that the
circumstances of confinement in this case were distinguishable
“in important respects” from those in Johnson v. Eisentrager, a
federal habeas jurisdiction existed to review the detention of noncitizens held by the
United States anywhere in the world.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer,
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 2029, 2058 (2007); see also John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 573, 589
(2006) (“Rasul leaves unclear . . . whether judicial review would apply beyond Cuba” to
the likes of “Saddam Hussein” and “Osama bin Laden.”). Justice Kennedy, in his
concurrence, assumed the more expansive application, see supra note 168, as did
Justice Scalia in his dissent. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“federal
courts will entertain petitions from these prisoners . . . around the world, challenging
actions and events far away . . . .”); see also Joseph R. Pope, The Lasting Viability of
Rasul in the Wake of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 21, 27
(2006) (agreeing with Scalia’s dissent, considering that American jurisdiction and
control “necessarily” extends to territories where the military detains persons).
59
See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000).
60
See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
61
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485. Justice Scalia scathingly dissented, see infra note
58; see also infra note 168, and Justice Kennedy concurred, offering an alternative
approach, see infra note 168.
In response to the majority holding, Congress passed, and the President
signed into law on December 30, 2005, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (“DTA”),
Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 801 and 28
U.S.C. § 2241). The DTA effectively precluded federal review of habeas challenges “by
alien[s] detained . . . at Guantanamo Bay.” See DTA, § 1005(e)(1) (“Except as provided
in section 1005 of the [DTA], no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider[] (1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; or (2) any other
action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention by
the Department of Defense of an alien at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who[] (A) is
currently in military custody; or (B) has been determined by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in accordance with the procedures set forth
in section 1005(e) of the [DTA] to have been properly detained as an enemy
combatant.”); see also Pope, supra note 58, at 27 (discussing history and implications of
DTA). This can be viewed as a significant retrenchment of federal judicial power in
favor of the Executive branch. See Elizabeth Starrs, Protect Habeas Corpus, DENVER
POST, April 29, 2007, at E-O1 (explaining that “Congress tried to circumvent [Rasul] by
passing the [DTA],” but noting that “[l]egislation designed to reinstate the right of
habeas corpus for Guantanamo Bay detainees is currently” under consideration.).
“However,” as emphasized by Pope, the DTA “failed to address the broader implications
of Rasul, which would allow federal courts to entertain habeas petitions brought by
detainees held in other theaters of the conflict.” Pope, supra note 58, at 24, 33-34
(opining that “Rasul’s imperfect holding opened a Pandora’s box Congress has failed to
close, leaving a great deal of uncertainty in an area where certainty is needed” and
suggesting that Congress “act quickly . . . . [to] draft legislation stripping the federal
courts of habeas jurisdiction over all detainees captured and held in territories outside
the United States,” so as “to more fully remediate the infirmities caused by Rasul.”).
Also, Congress failed to explicitly apply the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the DTA
retroactively to pending cases (such as Hamdan v. Rumsfeld). See supra note 104 and
accompanying text. But this shortcoming has apparently been fixed through
subsequent legislation. See id.
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case arising during World War II.62 The Rasul detainees, unlike
the Eisentrager detainees, had been detained for over two years
in territory subject to the United States’ exclusive control and
jurisdiction, without receiving access to counsel and without
having been charged with any crime.63 Nonetheless, the Rasul
Court emphasized that the outcome determinative facts
(relating to confinement) in Eisentrager64 only bore on the issue
of whether the detainees were constitutionally (as opposed to
statutorily) entitled to seek habeas relief.65
More essential to the resolution of the current dispute
was Braden v. Circuit Court of Kentucky, which postdated
Eisentrager.66 Since Braden, “the prisoner’s presence within the
territorial jurisdiction of the district court [had] not [been] ‘an
invariable prerequisite’ to the exercise of district court
jurisdiction under the federal habeas statute.”67 Satisfying the

62
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 765-66. According to the Rasul Court, the
Eisentrager Court considered the following facts critical to its conclusion that the
detainees in that case were not “constitutionally entitled” to pursue habeas relief: that
each detainee was

(a) . . . an enemy alien; (b) ha[d] never been . . . in the United States; (c) was
captured outside of [United States] territory and there held in military
custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a Military
Commission sitting outside the United States[] (e) for offenses against laws of
war committed outside the United States; (f) and [was] at all times
imprisoned outside the United States.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475-76 (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777).
63
Id. at 476. The Court also noted that the Rasul detainees were “not
nationals of countries at war with the United States, and they den[ied] that they ha[d]
engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the United States . . . .” Id.
64
See supra note 62.
65
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476 (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S at 777); see also Pope,
supra note 58, at 26 (“[T]he Court characterized Eisentrager as a case considering the
constitutional parameters of habeas corpus and not the statutory question that was
presented in Rasul.”) (footnote omitted). Eisentrager concluded, however, that the
detainees did not have a statutory right to pursue habeas relief because the habeas
statute, as that Court had interpreted it, required that the district court reviewing the
habeas petition have jurisdiction over the petitioners. Eisentrager, 339 U.S at 777-78.
Yet the Rasul Court concluded that the current case was controlled not by Eisentrager,
but by the more recent case, Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484,
495 (1973), which had effectively “overruled the statutory predicate to Eisentrager’s
holding.” Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-79.
66
See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-79; Braden, 410 U.S. at 495.
67
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478 (quoting Braden, 410 U.S. at 495); see also Fallon &
Meltzer, supra note 58, at 2051 (describing Braden as an example of the application by
the Supreme Court of the common law, as opposed to agency, approach to habeas
jurisdiction, whereby a relatively dynamic statutory interpretation was afforded “not
only to avoid constitutional difficulties, but also simply to achieve sensible results in
circumstances that Congress might not have foreseen”).
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habeas statute instead depended on whether the district court
could reach petitioners’ custodians by service of process.68
In the current case, no party contended that the
petitioners’ custodians were not subject to the jurisdiction of
the District Court for the District of Columbia.69 Pleading
requirements, moreover, had been satisfied.70 The federal
habeas statute, as the Court interpreted it, required “nothing
more” before a district court could entertain this case.71
C.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld: The Third Post-9/11 Detainee
Challenge

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld addressed not a jurisdictional issue,
as did Padilla v. Rumsfeld72 and Rasul v. Bush,73 but the
legality of a detainee’s confinement under the Authorization for
Use of Military Force (“AUMF”).74 In addressing the merits of
the habeas challenge, a plurality of the Court supported an
approach whereby legal determinations turned on the
circumstances of confinement as of the time of judicial review
and not on speculations, even if fairly reasonable, about future
conditions.75 This relatively limited temporal vantage point
68

Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-79.
Id. at 483.
70
Id. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
71
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483-84. The Court further held that the principle that a
statute should be presumed to not have extraterritorial application did not apply to an
area over which the United States exercised complete and exclusive (though not
necessarily sovereign) control. Id. at 480 (citing Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S.
281, 285 (1949)). Moreover, according to the Court, the habeas statute did not make
any distinctions based on citizenship or lack thereof. Id. at 481.
72
See supra Part I.A.
73
See supra Part I.B.
74
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516-24 (2004). The legality of Hamdi’s
detention under the AUMF is not a threshold issue in the same way that the issues
described in the other three post-9/11, war-on-terror detainee challenges are. (In
Padilla, Rasul, and Hamdan, the respective threshold issues had to be resolved in a
particular manner—namely, in a manner favorable for the detainee—in order for
review on the merits to proceed). In terms of resolution, this legality issue logically
preceded that of the judicial access owed to Hamdi (since this latter issue seemingly
would not be reached if Hamdi could not be lawfully detained in the first place), but
really was a merits-based determination in its own right. Yet inextricably linked to this
determination of the legality of the AUMF were determinations of the proper temporal
vantage point from which to assess this issue and, more simply, the extent to which to
consider the merits of this challenge. Thus, at least to some extent, it may be
appropriate (beyond merely convenient) to describe these underlying determinations as
threshold considerations.
75
Put another way, prospects, even if unprecedented in nature and even if
likely to occur, generally should not be considered justiciable if they have not yet been
substantially developed or realized. See infra Part III.A.
69
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resembled in certain ways the winnowing-down method
endorsed by Padilla v. Rumsfeld (though with regard to
jurisdictional requirements),76 but differed substantively from
the more expansive analytical framework employed later in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.77
1. The Facts of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
In Hamdi, the Court reviewed the claims of Yaser Esam
Hamdi, an American citizen accused of fighting alongside the
Taliban following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in late
2001.78 Hamdi was captured by the Northern Alliance soon
after the United States invaded.79 He was eventually turned
over to the U.S. military and transferred to the Guantanamo
Bay naval base.80 In April 2002, after learning that Hamdi was
an American citizen, the government relocated him to a naval
brig in Virginia.81
In June 2002, Hamdi’s father filed a habeas petition on
behalf of his son, alleging that Hamdi had been held without
access to any meaningful judicial process and had not been
charged with any crime, in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.82 The various
forms of relief sought included release from custody, access to
counsel, and permission to challenge Hamdi’s designation as an
enemy combatant.83
2. The Holdings of the Hamdi Court
The Hamdi Court did not produce a majority; Justice
O’Connor authored the plurality opinion.84 The plurality held
76

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part III.B.
78
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. By the time the Supreme Court heard this case, Hamdi had been
transferred to a military brig in South Carolina. Id.
82
Id. at 511. In other documents, Hamdi’s father claimed that his son had
traveled to Afghanistan to do relief work and had only been there for two months prior
to 9/11, but became trapped there during hostilities following 9/11 due to his youthful
inexperience. (He was only twenty at the time.) Id. at 511-12.
83
Id. at 511. For a summary of the complicated procedural history of Hamdi,
see James B. Anderson, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld: Judicious Balancing at the Intersection of
the Executive’s Power to Detain and the Citizen-Detainee’s Right to Due Process, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 689, 695-97 (2005).
84
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 508.
77
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that Congress, through the AUMF, had authorized the
detention of American citizens held in the United States whom
the government had designated as enemy combatants.85 But
the plurality also held that such citizen-detainees, in
accordance with constitutional due process, must be provided
with a meaningful opportunity, beyond the “some evidence”
standard, to challenge the factual basis of their designation as
enemy combatants before a neutral adjudicator.86 The Court
remanded the case for further proceedings.87
The latter holding, though vague, had significant
consequences for detainees,88 but this Note will only focus on
85

Id. at 518. This conclusion technically constituted a holding of the Court,
since Thomas, notwithstanding that he dissented, “agree[d] with the plurality that . . .
Congress [through the AUMF] ha[d] authorized the President” to “detain those arrayed
against our troops . . . .” Id. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Rotunda, supra
note 44, at 15, 28 (explaining how under the circumstances “it [made] sense to treat
O’Connor’s resolution as a workable holding of the Court”). Additionally, in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld (the subsequent detainee challenge arising from the war on terror), the Court
assumed, citing Hamdi, “that the AUMF activated the President’s war powers, and
that those powers include the authority to convene military commissions in
appropriate circumstances.” 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006) (citations omitted) (referring
to Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518). But see infra notes 109-114 and accompanying text.
86
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533, 537 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). As two other
members of the Court concurred with the plurality on this point, it constituted a
holding of the Court. Id. at 553 (Souter, J., concurring in part). But the concurrence
disagreed with the plurality’s conclusion that the due process required under the
circumstances was significantly less than that required in the context of the civilian
criminal justice system. Id. at 553-54 (referring to id. at 534-35 (O’Connor, J., plurality
opinion)). The plurality concluded, for example, that a federal court could abide by a
rebuttable presumption that favored evidence presented by the government. Id. at 534.
Hearsay evidence, moreover, could be deemed admissible. Id.; see also id. at 538
(noting the “possibility that the standards we [the plurality] articulated could be met
by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal”).
87
Id. at 539. For a discussion of the concurring and dissenting opinions (of
which the most interesting is that of Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens), see
Jared Perkins, Note and Comment, Habeas Corpus in the War Against Terrorism:
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Citizen Enemy Combatant, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 437, 451-55
(2005).
In October 2004, the government, rather than face further judicial
proceedings, released Hamdi from custody and deported him to Saudi Arabia upon the
stipulation that Hamdi renounce his citizenship and agree to several other conditions.
CNN-World, Hamdi Voices Innocence, Joy About Reunion, CNN.com, Oct. 14, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/14/hamdi/.
88
In response to Hamdi (see supra note 86 and accompanying text), the
government convened Combatant Status Review Tribunals (“CSRTs”) to determine
whether persons detained at Guantanamo Bay were enemy combatants. See Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunals, July 7,
2004, http://www.dod.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf; David B. Rivkin Jr. &
Lee A. Casey, How the System Works; Fact and Fiction on Enemy Combatants, WASH.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, at A21; see also Robert A. Peal, Special Project Note, Combatant
Status Review Tribunals and the Unique Nature of the War on Terror, 58 VAND. L. REV.
1629, 1650-54 (2005) (discussing CSRT procedures). These tribunals have faced
considerable criticism. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their
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the first holding. The plurality basically concluded that,
consistent with the traditional law of war, the “necessary and
appropriate force” authorized by the AUMF included the
detention of enemy combatants.89 Because hostilities were
ongoing in Afghanistan,90 Hamdi’s continued detention could be
justified even if his detention had no foreseeable endpoint and
feasibly could last for the rest of his life.91
D.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Fourth Post-9/11 Detainee
Challenge

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the fourth detainee challenge
heard by the Supreme Court following 9/11, ended on more
than one note of inconsistency with respect to the preceding
jurisprudence.92 Unlike the plurality in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the
Hamdan Court did not refrain from reviewing the legality of
circumstances that were fairly anticipated but that had not yet
occurred.93 Similarly, contrary to the logic of Rumsfeld v.
Padilla94 but in part reflecting that of Rasul v. Bush,95 the
Court seemed to collapse its perception of the strong merits of
the case (as well as its public importance) into threshold
determinations prerequisite to review on the merits.96

Day, But Hardly in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2004, at A1 (“Critics have complained
that the tribunals are fatally flawed, not only because the detainees do not have
lawyers but because they are generally hampered in disputing any charges because
they are not allowed to see most of the evidence against them because it is classified.”);
Joseph Blocher, Comment, Combatant Status Review Tribunals: Flawed Answers to the
Wrong Question, 116 YALE L.J. 667, 670 (2006) (CSRTs are not in compliance with
Geneva Conventions, because they do not determine POW status of detainees); see also
Mark Huband, Dock of the Bay, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 11, 2004, at 16 (account of
journalist permitted to attend tribunal hearing). But see Rivkin & Casey, supra
(arguing that the “current [CSRT] system offers a solid basis for processing enemy
combatants,” but advocating congressional codification of the system so as to reduce
political pressure and “judicial second-guessing”).
89
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518-19 (quoting AUMF, supra note 38) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
90
See infra notes 200-202 and accompanying text.
91
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521. This aspect of the decision will be discussed in
detail in the analysis section of this Note. See infra Part III.A.
92
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
93
See infra Part III.
94
See infra Part II.A.
95
See infra Part II.B.
96
See infra Part III.B.
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1. The Facts of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni national, was
captured by Afghan militias in November 2001 during
hostilities between the United States and the Taliban.97 The
U.S. military subsequently obtained custody of Hamdan and, in
June 2002, relocated him to the American prison in
Guantanamo Bay.98 In July 2004, pursuant to a 2001
presidential order authorizing the Secretary of Defense to
establish military commissions to try suspected terrorists,99 the
government charged Hamdan with conspiracy to “commit . . .
offenses triable by military commission.”100
On July 13, 2004, Hamdan filed a habeas petition “to
challenge the government’s intended means of prosecuting this
charge.”101 According to Hamdan, the commission “violate[d] the
most basic tenets of military and international law, including
the principle that a defendant must be permitted to see and
hear the evidence against him.”102

97

Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2759 (2006).
Id.
99
Executive Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) (“Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism”).
100
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759 (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The charging instrument alleged that from February 1996 to
November 24, 2001, Hamdan “willfully and knowingly joined an enterprise of persons
who shared a common criminal purpose and conspired and agreed with [named
members of al Qaeda] to commit the following offenses triable by military commission:
attacking civilians; attacking civilian objects; murder by an unprivileged belligerent;
and terrorism.” Id at 2761 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
101
Id. at 2759. Hamdan originally filed this petition in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington, but this court transferred the
petition to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia after the
government formally charged Hamdan. Id. at 2761. In the meantime, a CSRT (see
supra note 88) “convened pursuant to a military order issued on July 7, 2004, decided
that Hamdan’s continued detention at Guantanamo Bay was warranted because he
was an enemy combatant.” Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also infra note 114. At the same time, the military commission set to try
Hamdan commenced proceedings. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761.
102
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759. Hamdan also argued that the conspiracy
charge had no basis in either federal statutory law or the common law of war. Id.; see
also infra note 114. For thorough summaries of the lower court decisions and
underlying facts in this case, see Larissa Eustice, Case Summary, International
Decision: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
457, 457-75 (2006).
98
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2. The Holdings of the Hamdan Court
The Supreme Court first held that the recently enacted
Detainee Treatment Act (“DTA”)103 did not preclude the Court’s
jurisdiction over this claim. Although the Act strips federal
courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges filed by noncitizens detained at Guantanamo Bay (except for the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in limited
circumstances), it did not apply to cases pending at the time of
its enactment.104
103

DTA, supra note 61.
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2769 (finding “nothing absurd about a scheme
under which pending habeas actions—particularly those . . . that challenge the very
legitimacy of the tribunals whose judgments Congress would like to have reviewed—
are preserved, and more routine challenges to final decisions rendered by those
tribunals are carefully channeled to a particular court and through a particular lens of
review”). While this is a very significant jurisdictional holding, this Note will focus on
other threshold determinations made by the Court. For more information on this
holding, see Julia Y. Capozzi, Note, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: A Short-Lived Decision?, 28
WHITTIER L. REV. 1303, 1307-08, 1321-23 (2007) (stating that the holding was “wellfounded” given that the DTA lacks explicit language indicating that the DTA applies
“to pending cases arising out of [CSRTs] and military commissions decisions” with
respect to habeas petitions, and, “[t]hus, the Court was reasonable in holding that
where Congress omits language from a portion of a statute it means that Congress
intended to omit that language”) (citations omitted); Michael Greenberger, You Ain’t
Seen Nothin’ Yet: The Inevitable Post-Hamdan Conflict Between the Supreme Court and
the Political Branches, 66 MD. L. REV. 805, 809 (noting that habeas bar authors
“certainly” thought that DTA “clearly applied to cases pending at the time of” its
passage); Jana Singer, Hamdan as an Assertion of Judicial Power, 66 MD. L. REV. 759,
761-63 (2007) (stating that the holding “was far from self-evident,” considering
competing canons and precedents, but noting that the Court avoided complicated
constitutional analysis). The practical effect of this holding, as noted by a dissenting
Justice Scalia, would be “to keep the [federal] courts busy for years to come.” See
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2817-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Burt Neuborne, Spheres
of Justice: Who Decides? 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1090, 1099 (2006) (“[T]he majority’s
decision preserve[d] the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts over some six hundred
habeas corpus petitions from Guantanamo detainees pending on the day the
jurisdiction-stripping provision became effective.”).
Much as Congress responded to Rasul by passing the DTA, see supra note
61, Congress responded to Hamdan by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(“MCA”), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17, 2006), which apparently
supersedes the jurisdictional holding of Hamdan by suspending statutory habeas
corpus for alien-detainees. See MCA, § 7 (“No court, justice, or judge shall have
jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on
behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the
United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting
such determination.”). It is beyond the scope of this Note to explore in depth the effect
of the MCA on habeas jurisdiction and the attendant constitutional implications;
numerous articles have undertaken such comprehensive examinations. See, e.g., Daniel
Michael, The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 473, 473, 477
(2006) (concluding that the MCA “jurisdiction-stripping provision . . . is inconsistent
with the reach of constitutional guarantees as they have been defined in cases arising
from the war on terror,” but noting that the “MCA makes substantial improvements in
other areas”); Michael C. Dorf, The Orwellian Military Commissions Act of 2006, 5 J.
104
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The Court next rejected the government’s contention
that, even if the Court had jurisdiction to review Hamdan’s
procedural challenge to the military commission, the Court
should refrain from doing so in advance of a final outcome of
pending military proceedings in accordance with a judge-made
rule espoused in Schlesinger v. Councilman.105 Rather, the
Court found that immediate review of Hamdan’s procedural
challenge by a civilian court was warranted in light of the

INT’L CRIM. JUST. 10, 13, 15 (2007) (arguing that the jurisdiction-stripping provision is
unconstitutional “[a]bsent a valid suspension” of habeas corpus “to the extent that it
authorizes the government to . . . detain a permanent resident alien residing in [for
example] New York City, without ever permitting the alien to file a habeas petition”).
Dorf further states that the MCA presents “a veritable cornucopia of law school
examination questions,” such as “[u]nder what circumstances, if any, does an alien not
present in the territory of the United States but held by US authorities have a
constitutional right” to seek habeas relief in a federal court? Id. (emphasis added); see
also Michael C. Dorf, Why The Military Commissions Act Is No Moderate Compromise,
FINDLAW, Oct. 11, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20061011.html (criticizing
the act for “all but eliminat[ing] access to civilian courts for non-citizens . . . that the
government, in its nearly unreviewable discretion, determines to be unlawful enemy
combatants.”); Karen DeYoung, Court Told It Lacks Power in Detainee Cases, WASH.
POST, Oct. 20, 2006, at A18 (discussing how the statute has been criticized by some
U.S. Senators because it effectively suspends habeas corpus).
Litigation challenging the MCA (some of which involves Hamdan, see infra
note 114) has been underway since its passage, as would be expected given the
momentous implications of the Act. On December 5, the Supreme Court began to hear
oral arguments in Boumediene v. Bush, See The Oyez Project, Boumediene v. Bush:
Oral Argument, transcript available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/
2007_06_1195/argument/; Patti Waldmeir, Detainee Cases Split US Justices,
FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Dec. 6, 2007, at 8, after reversing its initial denial of
certiorari to hear this case. See Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (vacating
Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007) (denying certiorari)). This challenge stems
from a ruling by the Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, denying the consolidated
habeas petitions of aliens detained at the Guantanamo Bay naval base. Boumediene v.
Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007). That court held that federal courts lacked
jurisdiction in these cases because the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the MCA
applied to pending cases, id. at 986-88, and because this provision did not amount to an
unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus. Id. at 988-94. But see Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 16 (D.D.C. 2006) (“If and to the extent that the MCA
operates to make the writ unavailable to a person who is constitutionally entitled to it,
it must be unconstitutional.”). For more background on this decision,
see Linda Greenhouse, Legal Battle Resuming on Guantanamo Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/02/washington/
02scotus.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 (discussing the political and judicial contexts
surrounding this case); see also Michael, supra, at 481-92 (2007) (referencing the Court
of Appeals decision in a discussion of the constitutionality of the MCA jurisdictionstripping provision).
105
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2771 (discussing Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420
U.S. 738 (1975)). According to the Hamdan Court, the dual comity considerations
underlying the Councilman doctrine—military discipline and respect for the
congressionally established integrated military court system—were not present here.
Id. Hamdan was not a member of the armed forces and the military commission set to
try him was not part of this integrated court system. Id.

664

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:2

structural deficiencies of the Executive-established review
mechanism for the commission decision.106
Additionally, according to the Court, there were grounds
for presuming the illegality of the procedures governing the
military commission.107 In particular, under the commission
rules, Hamdan could be excluded from participating in his own
trial.108
Moving to the merits,109 the Court held that that the
military commission was not explicitly authorized by the
AUMF, DTA, or Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”).110
These congressional enactments, even when read together, at
most recognize the government’s general right to convene
military commissions, but they did not apply under the
particular circumstances.111 In the absence of explicit
congressional authority, the UCMJ permits trial by military
commission only if the commission complies with the
“Constitution and laws, including the law of war.”112 The Court
held that the military commission in question did not comply
with the laws of war, including the UCMJ itself, because the
major deviations from court-martial procedures113 were not
justified by military necessity.114
106
Id. at 2771-72 (expedited review warranted in “view of the public
importance of the questions raised . . . and of the duty which rests on the courts, in
time of war as well as in time of peace, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional
safeguards of civil liberty” (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942))). Put another
way, under the circumstances there should not have been any avoidable delay. See id.;
see also infra Part III.B.2.a.
107
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2788.
108
Id. at 2786. Furthermore, admissible evidence encompassed basically
anything with probative value, including hearsay and unsworn statements. Id. at 278687. These and other reasons for not abstaining will be discussed in greater detail infra
Part III.B.
109
This Note assesses the Court’s holdings on the merits only insofar as they
influenced or effectively interacted with the threshold determinations regarding
whether the Court should review on the merits Hamdan’s procedural challenge.
110
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774-75 (referring to the AUMF, supra note 38;
DTA, supra note 61; and UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000)).
111
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775.
112
Id. at 2775 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 821 (2000) (“The provisions of this code conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial
shall not be construed as depriving military commissions . . . of concurrent jurisdiction
in respect of offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by
such military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.” (emphasis
added)).
113
See infra Part III.B.2.a.
114
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2792-93; see also infra Part III.B.2.b. For similar
reasons, the commission did not qualify as a “regularly constituted” court and thus
violated Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2793,
2796-97 (referring to Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
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art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
POW Treatment]. The Article provides, “In the case of armed conflict not of an
international character . . . the following acts . . . remain prohibited . . . the passing of
sentences . . . without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court . . . .” Id., art. 3. This provision is typically referred to as “Common Article 3” as it
is found in all four of the Geneva Conventions, but for the sake of brevity, the Court
only cited the third Convention. See id. at 2795 n.59.
A plurality of the Court also held that the law of war did not recognize
conspiracy as a crime. Id. at 2777-78 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). For a discussion of
the several concurring and dissenting opinions (five in all), see Julia Y. Capozzi, supra
note 104, at 1315-21; Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National
Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 17-22 (2006). Sunstein even
“nominate[s] Hamdan as the all-time champion” of divisive Supreme Court opinions.
Id. at 4.
On remand from the Supreme Court, the District Court for the District of
Columbia confronted the case in the context of the newly enacted MCA. See Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2006); see also supra note 104. The court held that
Hamdan, now deprived of a statutory basis for seeking habeas relief, Hamdan, 464 F.
Supp. 2d at 12 (finding “unsuccessful” the argument that the MCA retroactivity
provision did not apply to the jurisdiction-stripping provision), was not constitutionally
entitled to the great writ of habeas corpus given his status as an extraterritorially
located alien-detainee. Hamdan, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 12, 18. For further discussion of
this decision, see Neil A. Lewis, Judge Sets Back Guantanamo Detainees, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 2007, at A32; Greenberger, supra note 104, at 810 n.31; Jordan J. Paust, Above
the Law: Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment, Secret
Renditions, Domestic Spying, and Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L.
REV. 345, 416 n.208 (2007) (disagreeing with aspects of the court’s analysis). In a later
proceeding, the Supreme Court declined to hear the “unusual” petition for certiorari of
Hamdan and fellow detainee, Omar Khadr. Hamdan v. Gates, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2133 (2007); Brief for the Respondents at 1, Hamdan v.
Gates, 127 S. Ct. 2133 (2007), 2007 WL 965445; see also Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Supreme
Court Denies Certiorari for Guantanamo Petitions, 23 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 7
(2007) (discussing the petitioners’ circumstances).
In June 2007, a military judge dismissed all military commission (i.e., war
crimes) charges against Hamdan due to the failure of the CSRT system to classify him
as an “unlawful” enemy combatant (as opposed to just an “enemy combatant”).
Editorial, Stuck in Guantanamo, WASH. POST, June 7, 2007, at A26, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/06/AR2007060602302.html.
Consequently, per the Geneva Conventions, Hamdan was entitled to prisoner of war
status. See id; see also William Glaberson, Tribunal Complicates Policy on Detainees;
Guantanamo Judges Dismiss Charges in 2 War-Crimes Cases, INT’L HERALD TRIB.,
June 6, 2007, at 7 (“[Senator Arlen Specter] said it was ‘dead wrong’ for anyone to
assert that Congress intended to permit prosecution of detainees who had not been
declared unlawful enemy combatants.”). This ruling highlighted systemic problems
with the post-9/11 system of detaining and prosecuting suspected terrorists. See id.
(chief military defense lawyer describing the decision as emphasizing a lack of
“international legitimacy and legal authority” of the military commission process); see
also Stuck in Guantanamo, supra (describing possibilities for congressional reform of
tribunal process and mechanisms of judicial review).
The procedural deficiency that prompted this dismissal of charges,
however, is evidently curable by a determination of unlawful enemy combatant
status at the military commission level itself. See Josh White, Court Reverses
Ruling on Detainee, WASH. POST, Sep. 25 2007, at A04, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/24/AR2007092401848.html.
In a related detainee challenge, a military commission review panel ruled “that
[commission] trial judges can hear evidence on a detainee’s combatant status and
therefore can proceed with the trials.” Id. (finding that the trial judge hearing the case
incorrectly “believed he could not make such a determination of ‘unlawful’ status.”).
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SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND JURISDICTION

One question permeating the Supreme Court’s post-9/11
war-on-terror jurisprudence is the extent to which federal
courts should afford special treatment to detainee challenges
when assessing jurisdictional or other threshold issues. This
section will address a specific subset of this issue: whether the
merits of a detainee challenge or exceptional surrounding
circumstances should be considered in determining whether
the petitioner has satisfied jurisdictional requirements
prerequisite to review on these merits. The considerations
underlying this inquiry relate to those underlying the general
issue of the proper scope of review for detainee challenges, as
well as the more specific issue (addressed in Part III) of the
appropriate temporal vantage point to apply.
Returning to the focus of this section, a circumspect
examination might suggest that even challenges to military
detention by alleged enemy combatants deserve the same
treatment as other challenges to physical custody, as seen in
Rumsfeld v. Padilla.115 Bending, twisting, or overriding
jurisdictional rules to accommodate the resolution of the
profound substantive issues raised by these challenges could
lead to rampant forum shopping and thereby diminish judicial
efficiency.116 Arguably, considerations of judicial economy alone
do not militate against a more flexible jurisdictional treatment
when major personal liberties or even human rights are on the
line. Still, allowing ad hoc exceptions based on the importance
of a case could turn federal courts into arbiters of a largely
normative set of criteria—in short, the public interest.117
In Rasul v. Bush,118 the Court, perhaps searching for
some middle ground, heeded this notion in a technical sense.
But, essentially in defiance of the principle of judicial restraint
(at least as understood by the Padilla Court), the Rasul Court
Pursuant to this authority, in December 2007, a military judge in the Hamdan case
held that Hamdan is an unlawful enemy combatant and is thereby subject to trial by
military commission. United States v. Hamdan, On Reconsideration: Ruling on Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Military Comm’n, Dec. 19, 2007) (Allred, J.),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2007/Hamdan-Jurisdiction%20After%
20Reconsideration%20Ruling.pdf; Reuters, NYT Bin Laden’s Driver Is Not POW,
Judge Says, Dec. 20, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/news/newsguantanamo-hamdan.html.
115
See infra Part II.A.
116
See infra note 147.
117
See infra notes 144-147 and accompanying text.
118
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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appeared to justify its far-reaching jurisdictional conclusion
by invoking its perceptions of the substantive worth and
momentous implications of the underlying detainee
challenge.119 It is to a more specific discussion of these cases
that this Note will now turn.
A.

Rumsfeld v. Padilla: Sticking to the Core
1. The General Approach of the Padilla Court

Rumsfeld v. Padilla firmly stands for the proposition
that federal courts generally should not consider special or
extraordinary circumstances surrounding a federal habeas
challenge when determining jurisdictional standing, even of
alleged enemy combatants detained outside the civilian
criminal system.120 The general approach that the Padilla
Court advocated instead may be described as follows: whenever
possible (as opposed to when subjectively preferable), a
reviewing court should analyze a habeas challenge in
accordance with rigid jurisdictional rules derived from the
relevant habeas statute.121 To elaborate, if the dispute at the
most reduced factual level, without regard to the equities of the
case, admits to reasonable interpretation within the traditional
habeas analysis, then its resolution should proceed accordingly.
The presence of amenable circumstances, rather than the
absence of any unusual factors, thus determines the outcome.122
Departures from this established framework should occur only
in response to factual incompatibilities between present
circumstances and the core assumptions—particularly, present
physical custody in the United States—that informed the
development of the old rules.123
119

See infra Part II.B.
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447-50 (2004).
121
See id.
122
See id. at 449-50.
123
See id. at 435-36. Exceptions to traditional jurisdictional requirements
potentially could be warranted where the habeas petitioner challenged something other
than present physical custody, such as reservist status in the armed forces, id. at 43839, 449-50, or a term of imprisonment that had not yet commenced, id. at 438-39, or
where the petitioner, assuming that he was a citizen, was held outside of the United
States. Id. at 435 n.8, 447 n.16. Deviations likewise could be supported where the
location of the detainee or the identity of his custodian was unknown, id. at 450 n.18,
or where the government relocated a detainee following a proper filing of his petition.
Id. at 440-41. Perhaps even government impropriety, under certain circumstances,
could justify a departure from the strict jurisdictional rules. See id. at 449 n.17; see also
infra note 137 and accompanying text. The Court stressed, however, that the existence
120

668

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:2

2. Application of the Traditional Habeas Paradigm to
the facts of Padilla
Applying the foregoing logic to the specific dispute, the
Padilla Court declined to make exceptions to strict, statutorily
derived jurisdictional rules due to any “undeniably unique”
circumstances surrounding Padilla’s military detention.124
These circumstances generally pertained to the war-on-terror
context in which Padilla’s detention arose.125 The Court
similarly
refused
to
overlook
traditional
threshold
requirements in order to accommodate the profound securityversus-liberty debate embodied by this detainee challenge.126 As
the Court reasoned, the outcome of the jurisdictional dispute
should be controlled not by the relative equities, but by more
objectively grounded criteria.127
Directing the jurisdictional inquiry accordingly, the
dispute found immediate disposition within the traditional
habeas framework.128 This conclusion obtained despite the
rapid and ex parte nature of Padilla’s removal from the civilian
criminal system and despite the arguably unprecedented
personal involvement of the Secretary of Defense in relocating
an American citizen from civilian to military confinement.129
Padilla had challenged his present physical confinement, the
location of which was known and was obviously within the
United States.130 The identity of Padilla’s immediate custodian,
Commander Marr, the person who exercised actual day-to-day
control over Padilla, likewise had been revealed.131 Moreover,
the relocation of Padilla to a military facility, although
government-induced, occurred prior to, not following, the filing
of the habeas petition.132 Thus, despite the presence of atypical

of certain jurisprudential exceptions to strict, statutorily derived jurisdictional rules
did not detract from the otherwise applicability of these rules to core challenges like
Padilla’s, where none of the above potential reasons for departure were present. See
Padilla, 542 U.S. at 446-47; see also infra notes 128-133 and accompanying text.
124
See Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441 (2004); supra notes 45-48 and accompanying
text.
125
See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 437-38, 441, 447-51.
126
See id. at 450-51.
127
See id. at 441.
128
Id.
129
See id. at 440 n.13, 448-49.
130
Id. at 441, 446; see also id. at 450, n.18.
131
Id. at 450 n.18.
132
Id. at 431-32.
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factors, the case ultimately broke down into the usual
elements.133
The Court further reinforced the factual and subjective
distinctions of the traditional habeas paradigm when
addressing the issue of alleged government impropriety.134 In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens suggested that the
Court should proceed as if Padilla’s counsel had filed the
petition before the removal of Padilla from the Southern
District of New York—especially when considering that the
government had quietly, if not secretly, conducted the
relocation process and had not provided Padilla’s counsel with
sufficient notice of its intentions.135 But a majority of the Court
chose not to “indulge” this equity-driven legal fiction, viewing it
as incompatible with the facts-based traditional approach to
which the Court instead subscribed.136
Still, the Padilla Court hinted, albeit in dictum in a
footnote, that greater flexibility could have been accorded to
the jurisdictional rules if the evidentiary record had clearly
established that the government purposely “shrouded . . . in
secrecy” the relocation process or intended to deceive Padilla’s
counsel about his client’s whereabouts.137 In any event,
according to the Court, Padilla’s counsel at the time of filing
apparently knew, even if only from media sources, about
Padilla’s removal from the Southern District.138 That the
Padilla Court considered information obtained in this indirect
manner and from a non-governmental source as sufficient
notice exemplifies this Court’s manner of disregarding
normative viewpoints in arriving at threshold conclusions.139
Much as the Court considered it more significant that
Commander Marr exerted immediate control over Padilla than
that Secretary Rumsfeld had exercised substantial control over
the relocation process, the fact that Padilla’s counsel knew
about the relocation prior to filing the habeas petition carried
133

See id. at 441.
See id. at 448-49.
135
See id. at 458-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136
See id. at 448-49 (majority opinion). The relative insularity of the Padilla
Court’s approach bears some resemblance to the temporally restricted, present vantage
point approach later advanced by a plurality in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. See infra Part
III.A. Yet it contrasts sharply with that in Rasul v. Bush and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. See
infra Part III.B.
137
See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 449 n.17 (citing Padilla, 542 U.S. at 459 n.3
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
138
See id. at 449 n.17; see also id. at 459 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139
See id. at 449 n.17 (majority opinion).
134
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greater legal relevance than the question of how counsel
learned (or did not learn) about the relocation.
3. Rationales of the Padilla Court: Advocating a
Position of Restraint
As demonstrated by the application of the traditional
habeas framework to the specific question presented in Padilla,
the Padilla Court called for a relatively strict separation
between the jurisdictional and substantive elements of a
habeas petition. The Court refused to deviate from the
jurisdictional conventions of habeas corpus just because the
merits of the case were extraordinary in nature.140 Instead, to
contain the sort of merits- or dicta-creep evident in the
dissenting opinion,141 the Court broadly defined core habeas
challenges.142 This definition includes any case that sensibly
can be resolved in accordance with traditional threshold
requirements. Even cases involving U.S. citizens subject to
military detainment as part of the war against terror feasibly
could be considered run of the mill, at least insofar as
jurisdiction is concerned.143 Thereby, in the majority of cases,
the relative equities would not come into play until formal
consideration of the merits.
A more liberal alternative, or a position of less judicial
restraint, as espoused by the dissent,144 would force district
140

See id. at 447-51.
See infra note 144 and accompanying text. This dissent was a preview for
the majority opinion to come in Rasul v. Bush. See infra Part II.B.
142
See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 447-51.
143
See id. at 450-51.
144
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, resoundingly
disagreed with the majority with respect to the role that the extraordinary
circumstances surrounding this case should play in determining Padilla’s jurisdictional
standing. See id. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent described, in particular,
how the unprecedented personal involvement of the Secretary of Defense in overseeing
the removal of Padilla from the civilian criminal system posed “a unique . . . threat to
the freedom of every American citizen.” Id. at 461. More generally, this case presented
a profound debate between personal liberties and national securities. Id. at 465. The
dissent further commented on the dangerous situation presented when a democracy
resorts to major breaches of basic personal liberties in order to maintain national
security. See id. Overcoming the “forces of tyranny” requires continual adherence by
the government to the fundamental values represented by the American flag. Id. In
light of the exceptionality of this case, the Court had an affirmative duty to review the
case on the merits, regardless of the ultimate determination at this level. Id. at 465.
“Special treatment,” as opposed to strict adherence to formalistic rules, thus was
warranted at least at the threshold jurisdictional level. Id. at 460; see also Padilla v.
Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1064 (2006) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(noting that the substantive question raised in Rumsfeld v. Padilla—whether the
141
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courts to make “ad hoc determinations as to whether the
circumstances of a given case are exceptional, special, or
unusual enough to require departure from the jurisdictional
rules [the] Court has consistently applied.”145 Bending these
rules in order to facilitate discussion of the controversies
engendered by this case would, if anything, cause further
uncertainty regarding the war on terror, or so the majority
seemed to imply.146 In sum, prudential considerations prevailed
over equitable considerations of jurisdiction for war-on-terror
habeas challenges, where the jurisdictional issues could be
feasibly resolved within the traditional paradigm.147
B.

Rasul v. Bush: Veiled Judicial Activism
1. The General Approach of the Rasul Court

In Rasul v. Bush, the Court at least tacitly condoned
appealing to the merits of a detainee challenge as a means of
enhancing statutorily derived jurisdictional conclusions.148 The
Rasul Court, unlike the Padilla Court, effectively conflated the
jurisdictional and substantive components of the habeas
challenge with which it was presented.149 But rather than
disclaiming outright the sort of prudential considerations (and
corresponding winnowing-down approach) advanced in

“President ha[d] authority to imprison indefinitely a United States citizen arrested on
United States soil distant from a zone of combat, based on an Executive declaration
that the citizen was, at the time of his arrest, an enemy combatant . . . [was] a question
the Court heard, and should have decided, two years ago”). But see Fallon & Meltzer,
supra note 58, at 2052-53 (arguing that the jurisdictional factors in Padilla were “close
to equipoise” when “taken in isolation”; considering this and that at least some of the
Justices who joined the majority may have disagreed with the illegality of Padilla’s
detention, “postponing resolution” on the matter was not inconsistent with a sensible,
“common law” approach to habeas jurisdiction).
145
See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 450 (majority opinion) (internal quotations
omitted).
146
See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 450-51.
147
The Court also emphasized that the traditional jurisdictional rules “serve[]
the important purpose of preventing forum shopping by habeas petitioners.” Id. at 447.
In the absence of these rules, “a prisoner could name a high-level supervisory official as
respondent and then sue that person wherever he is amenable to long-arm jurisdiction.
The result would be rampant forum shopping, district courts with overlapping
jurisdiction, and the very inconvenience, expense, and embarrassment Congress [had]
sought to avoid” through its design of the federal habeas statute. Id. (referring to 28
U.S.C. § 2241).
148
See infra Part II.B.2.
149
Recall that Padilla strongly advised against such blending together, even
with respect to challenges by suspected terrorists. See supra Part II.A.
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Padilla,150 the Rasul Court proceeded more obliquely. On the
one hand, the Rasul Court proclaimed to subscribe to a strict
mode of statutory construction, much as did the Padilla
Court.151 On the other hand, unlike in Padilla, the Court in
several instances incorporated into its analysis (albeit
indirectly) factors relating to the merits of the detainee
challenge.152 Due to these competing observations, it is difficult
to discern from Rasul’s specific resolution any coherent
message regarding special considerations and jurisdictional
standing. If the Court’s tortuous analysis could be broken down
into distinct tiers, it could be said that, first, formal statutory
conclusions were made and, second, these conclusions were
defended via the substantive attributes of the case. The net
result was a form of judicial activism that, despite its subtle
implementation, had far-reaching consequences.153
2. Incorporating the Merits into the Specific Resolution
of Rasul
The Rasul Court, notwithstanding its purportedly
narrow approach,154 supported its formal jurisdictional holding
150

See supra Part II.A.
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 478-79, 483-84 (2004).
152
See infra Part II.B.2; see also Pope, supra note 58, at 26-27 (describing
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Rasul). As described by Pope:
151

In a biting dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the Rasul majority had done
great violence both to the habeas statute and to the Eisentrager decision . . .
[which, in his view] did pass judgment on whether the habeas statute
granted jurisdiction over the claims of foreign nationals held outside the
United States. He asserted that the brevity of the Eisentrager court’s analysis
signified that it was nothing more than an axiomatic proposition that the
statute failed to reach the Eisentrager detainees. Accordingly, in his view, the
[Rasul] Court had completely recast precedent in order to reach a more
palatable result while at the same time appearing to give due deference to
precedent. This jurisprudence, he argued, was an example of “judicial
adventurism of the worst sort.”
Id. at 26-27 (emphasis added) (citing Rasul, 542 U.S. at 488, 490, 493, 506 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)) (criticizing the majority’s “clumsy, countertextual reinterpretation” of the
habeas statute and attendant precedent as a wholesale “departure from . . . stare
decisis”).
153
See supra notes 58, 61 and accompanying text. For a principled defense of
Rasul, despite its “shortcomings in explanation,” see generally Fallon & Meltzer, supra
note 58. Fallon & Meltzer argue that the “specific outcome seems entirely plausible . . .
within the Common Law Model [of habeas corpus jurisdiction], based on the special
status of Guantánamo Bay,” over which the United States exercises complete control
pursuant to a lease agreement. Id. at 2059-60. Moreover, this “modest extension of
jurisdiction avoided or at least postponed a welter of [constitutional] difficulties.” Id.
154
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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by referencing the special circumstances that essentially
formed the substantive basis of the petitioners’ challenge.
Factors affecting the merits of the case included that the Rasul
petitioners (while denying the government’s allegations) had
been detained for over two years in territory subject to the
exclusive control and jurisdiction of the United States without
having received access to counsel and without having been
charged with any crime.155 The Court concluded, however,
that the narrow and sole issue in this case—whether “United
States courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the
legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad
in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base”156—could be resolved readily
and solely under the federal habeas statutory framework (that
is, without resort to constitutional fundamentals),157 and hence
in a single tier of analysis. Nonetheless, the manner by which
the Court referred to the merits of the case, and ascribed
significance to them, suggests an additional tier of analysis
going well beyond any clear-cut statutory considerations.
The Court first alluded to the circumstances
surrounding the confinement of the Rasul detainees when
distinguishing this case from Johnson v. Eisentrager on
apparently constitutional grounds.158 But the Court
subsequently concluded that resolving the present dispute did
not require making this merits-based distinction, given that it
did not bear directly, or even indirectly, on the question of
statutory habeas jurisdiction and given that Eisentrager did
not bar review of the Rasul detainees’ challenge under the
federal habeas statute.159 The prominent inclusion of this
distinction begs the question of the Court’s purpose; whatever
relevance these circumstances had to this case, the Court failed
to explain why it introduced them in that particular context
and manner. If the Court had sought only to make an
additional point apart from its specific legal conclusion, then
surely it could have delineated this purpose more clearly.
Instead, this statement tends to refute the Court’s

155

Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483 n.15 (2004).
Id. at 470. But see infra notes 166-168 and accompanying text.
157
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
158
See Johnson v. Eisentrager 339 U.S. 763 (1950); supra notes 62-65 and
accompanying text.
159
See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
156
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proclamations of narrow judicial review devoid of any
consideration of the merits.160
Later in the opinion, as the Court directly recited the
seemingly ultimate conclusion of the case,161 an accompanying
footnote stated that the petitioners’ allegations, if true, would
“unquestionably” demonstrate the illegality of their
confinement.162 Indeed, this statement pertained to pleading
requirements (as opposed to the question of the appropriate
forum or court) and appeared outside of the main body of the
opinion.163 Still, the Court seemed to invoke the substance of
the petitioners’ challenge in order to reinforce its formal
statutory conclusion, especially when viewing the footnote
statement alongside the earlier treatment of the merits of the
case vis-à-vis Eisentrager.164 Further supporting this assertion
is the statement’s textual proximity to the formal statutory
conclusion of the case. Pleading requirements, moreover, were
not even at issue.165
The Court, in a last-ditch effort to infuse viability into
its formal holding, restated the issue of the case in the final
paragraph of the opinion as follows: “[w]hat is presently at
stake is only whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to
determine the legality of the Executive’s potentially indefinite
detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of
wrongdoing.”166 While not unreasonable to expect a bold dictum
in the concluding paragraph of a high-profile, politically
charged case such as this, the Court proceeded as if it were
simply restating the exclusive issue.167 But even assuming that
the emphasized phrase in the Court’s statement did validly
160

See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
162
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483 n.15 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)) (“Petitioners’
allegations—that, although they have engaged neither in combat nor in acts of
terrorism against the United States, they have been held in executive detention for
more than two years in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and
control of the United States, without access to counsel and without being charged with
any wrongdoing—unquestionably describe ‘custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States.’”).
163
See id.
164
See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
165
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
166
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485 (emphasis added); see also id. at 475 (“The question
now before us is whether the habeas statute confers a right to judicial review of the
legality of Executive detention of aliens in a territory over which the United States
exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not ultimate sovereignty.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
167
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
161
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relate to pleading requirements, this statement did not simply
restate an issue dealing solely with statutorily conferred
jurisdiction. To the contrary, the merits of the case crept into
and served to justify the statutory findings.168

168
Contrast the Rasul Court’s approach with that advanced by Justice
Kennedy in his concurring opinion. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485-88 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Unlike the majority opinion, Kennedy directly viewed the particular case
“against the backdrop of the constitutional command of the separation of powers” in
resolving the jurisdictional issue. Id. at 485-86. One special circumstance militating in
favor of finding that district courts have jurisdiction to hear these claims was that the
petitioners were being held in an area over which the United States exercised exclusive
and plenary control. Id. at 487. Another critical factor was that the petitioners were
being held in “indefinite pretrial detention” when it was not clear that such prolonged
detention was justified by military exigency. Id. at 488.
Kennedy concluded that although “detention without proceedings or trial
would be justified by military necessity for a matter of weeks,” the rationale for
prolonged detention due to military exigency loses strength “as the period of detention
stretches from months to years.” Id. A case-specific approach, according to Kennedy,
would have avoided the dramatic effect of the majority opinion, which he interpreted as
granting an automatic right to statutory habeas jurisdiction to persons detained
outside of the United States. Id.
It is worth noting, in the context of judicial decision-making, the
connection between the particular legal lens (constitutional, legislative, or even
international) through which a detainee challenge is viewed and the perceived scope or
consequences of the resolution. As Rotunda points out, “[c]onstitutional rulings cannot
be overturned by mere legislation,” but “Congress, if it chose to do so, could amend the
[habeas] statute and go back to the world before the Supreme Court reinterpreted it.”
Rotunda, supra note 44, at 48. It thus may seem strange that Justice Kennedy
lamented the tremendous effects of the Rasul majority’s statutory-based conclusion,
despite the ready possibility of congressional reaction and correction, and instead
promoted a constitutionally oriented approach. Perhaps this can be reconciled on the
basis that Kennedy’s balancing test would be very fact specific and therefore avoid or
delay creating immutable legal principles.
Kennedy, in any event, did seem to proceed in a more open and honest
fashion than the Rasul majority, and his approach would produce, in at least one
important respect, less drastic results than that adopted by the majority. Nonetheless,
it is difficult to square the Kennedy approach with that of Padilla, which admonished
against making ad hoc determinations about the exceptionality or uniqueness of a
detainee challenge when resolving jurisdictional issues. See supra Part II.A.3; see also
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 496 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing Kennedy’s balancing test
approach for “provid[ing] enticing law-school-exam imponderables in an area where
certainty is called for”). Justice Scalia noted that under the ad hoc test espoused by
Kennedy, “courts would always have authority to inquire into circumstances of
confinement,” when making jurisdictional determinations. Id. Among the questions
reviewing courts would have to address are “When does definite detention become
indefinite?” and “How much [judicial] process will suffice to stave off jurisdiction?” Id.
These criticisms in a more general sense could also describe the approach
of the Rasul majority, which, as described in this subsection, appeared to commingle
jurisdictional and substantive considerations.
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3. Rasul’s Incompatibility with Padilla
As described above, the Rasul Court surreptitiously
evaded a path of judicial restraint.169 Rasul, however, did not
explicitly redefine core habeas petitions, as they had been
defined in Padilla, to categorically exclude detainee challenges
characterized by extraordinary circumstances or great legal
uncertainty.170 Moreover, the oblique connection drawn between
special circumstances and jurisdictional standing might seem
to produce only indirect effects—serving, in other words, to
strengthen or buttress the formal statutory holding. Yet, in
light of Rasul’s mixed messages, it is difficult to assess the
stand-alone power of the formal holding. More specifically, the
merit-based considerations cannot easily be parsed from the
purportedly strict determinations underlying the technical
legal conclusions.171 Overall, the zigzagging path of Rasul
evades meaningful reconciliation with that of the more
straightforward Padilla.
Rasul also deviated from the specific rationales
underlying Padilla, including preventing case-by-case determinations by federal courts as to whether the circumstances
surrounding a detainee challenge are sufficiently exceptional to
warrant digressions from traditional jurisdictional rules.172 A
reviewing court indeed would avoid making such ad hoc
conclusions in the first or primary tier of analysis (which,
again, was the only level of analysis explicitly undertaken by
the Rasul Court), assuming that this analysis entailed only
strict statutory considerations. But the second or supplemental
tier of analysis (which was effectively undertaken by the Rasul
Court, its denials notwithstanding173) would essentially require
assessing the merits of a habeas challenge to determine
whether they are special enough, or bear on adequately
important liberty interests, to justify the first-tier conclusions.
Yet in actual cases this two-tiered approach would
not be applied as neatly as has been described here,
considering that it was not directly enunciated but rather
implied by Rasul’s obscure reasoning. In practice, the two
levels of analysis cannot be meaningfully differentiated and
169
170
171
172
173

See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.3.
See supra Part II.B.2.
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basically would occur simultaneously. Regardless of the exact
description befitting the Rasul approach, the point remains
that this approach may condone, at least tacitly, a level of
complex judicial determination that transcends the rigid limits
envisioned by Padilla, its more level-headed sister case.174
Applying this convoluted style may decrease indeterminably
the level of restraint exercised by a reviewing court because the
extent of change will not be ascertainable amidst the fuzzy
reasoning.
C.

The Resultant Shaky Line of Precedent

Viewed together, Rumsfeld v. Padilla and Rasul v. Bush
provide little coherent guidance on the subject of special
circumstances and jurisdictional standing. Given their
antagonisms, this pair of cases set the foundation soon after
9/11 for an unstable line of precedent. In Padilla, the Supreme
Court applied strict statutory analysis to arrive at its formal
jurisdictional conclusion.175 By contrast, in Rasul, the Court
only superficially refrained from considering the merits or the
exceptional surrounding circumstances of its corresponding
detainee challenge.176 Consequently, Rasul added a layer of
perplexity to the Supreme Court’s post-9/11 war-on-terror
jurisprudence and, in doing so, increased the general tension
that already engulfed the topic.
The refusal by a plurality of the Court in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld to review an issue on the basis of a future prospect
(despite its likelihood of occurrence)177 perhaps to some extent
mitigates the influence of Rasul and, alongside Padilla,
reinforces a basic message of restraint. Still, Hamdi could not
fully overshadow the more expansive analytical framework
adopted in Rasul and, most recently, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.178
Nor could Hamdi and Padilla, in combined force, mask the
overall instability of the jurisprudence.

174
175
176
177
178

See supra Part II.A & B.2.
See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra Part II.B.2 & B.3.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
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SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND ANTICIPATORY REVIEW

Another significant feature of the Supreme Court’s post9/11 war-on-terror jurisprudence has been the issue of whether
federal courts should review detainee challenges that are based
in substantial part on future prospects or anticipated events.
The question, in other words, is whether such claims are ripe
for review given the current factual and legal climates and in
view of reasonably possible subsequent occurrences. Closely
tied to this inquiry is whether an expedited form of review is
warranted given the important, though still developing,
substantive attributes of a detainee challenge. An affirmative
answer may require courts to make ad hoc determinations
about whether and what types of circumstances qualify as
exceptional—a situation similar to that disfavored by Rumsfeld
v. Padilla with respect to jurisdictional standing.179 This same
answer may also necessitate a certain degree of judicial
guesswork in regard to expected factual as well as legal
developments, which may be viewed as a lack of restraint, at
least in a temporal sense.
This sort of prospective temporal vantage point, given
its relative uncertainty, was viewed with caution by the
plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.180 Legal constructs (at
least in the context of detainee challenges), the plurality
implied, should develop in tandem with, not in anticipation of,
events and circumstances.181 In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, by
contrast, the Court demonstrated a willingness to review the
legality of government actions before they fully occurred, where
there were sufficiently grounded reasons to presume the
illegality of such actions and where major liberty interests or
traditional judicial protections were at stake.182 At a minimum,
Hamdan suggested that the importance of a dispute, even
when not finalized, may override considerations of deference to
the executive branch.183 This section will examine these cases
individually as well as in contrast to each other and in relation
to Padilla and Rasul.

179
180
181
182
183

See supra Part II.A.3.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.B.2.a.
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1. The General Approach of the Hamdi Plurality
In a manner comparable to the winnowing-down
approach endorsed by Padilla v. Rumsfeld,184 the plurality in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld perceived substantive issues related to the
legality of detention (as distinct from the level of judicial
process owed to detainees) from a narrow, temporally restricted
vantage point.185 The plurality supported the following
approach: whenever practicable—as opposed to when
normatively preferable—the resolution of the substantive
issues of a detainee challenge should turn on the circumstances
of confinement as they present themselves at the time of
judicial review, and not on speculations, even if fairly
reasonable, about future scenarios.186 A dispute likewise should

184

See supra Part II.A.
See infra Part III.A.2.
186
Compare this approach to that employed by Justice Kennedy in Padilla v.
Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1062-64 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in denial of certiorari),
where the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari to review the claims of the
successor case to Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). See Padilla v. Hanft, 547
U.S. at 1063. As described by Justice Kennedy, these claims were now premised on
hypothetical scenarios. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
Regardless of whether Padilla’s claims were mooted by the fact that he had received
the principal relief that he had sought, “prudential considerations” militated against
reviewing Padilla’s claims when the relief sought would have no practical effect unless
the government proceeded to remove him, once again, from the civilian criminal
system. See id. Review thus was not justified where Padilla’s return to military custody
remained a possibility but was not an actual reality. See id. But see Rotunda, supra
note 44, at 42 (arguing that “the issue [was] simply not moot” given that, among other
reasons, Padilla could seek damages if he was “held unconstitutionally for the last
several years”).
Still, the perceived threat that his status or the circumstances of his
confinement could be changed yet again by the government warranted an expedited
review by the district court overseeing Padilla’s case, in the event that such threat was
realized. See Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. at 1064. Because Padilla was receiving the
relief he had sought and because he was not contesting the lawfulness of his civilian
detention, resolving the current dispute (as presented by Padilla in his writ of
certiorari) perhaps required nothing more than for the district court to remain alert
and attuned to change. See id. By this reasoning, a federal court could defensively
anticipate future governmental abuses when there is a reasonable prospect of their
occurrence, but could not respond preemptively.
Contrast Justice Kennedy’s reasoning here, id. at 1062-64, as well as that
of the plurality in Hamdi, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (O’Connor, J.,
plurality opinion), with the dissent of Justice Breyer in Boumediene, Boumediene v.
Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1479-81 (April 2, 2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari), vacated, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (June 29, 2007) (granting certiorari); see also supra
note 104. Citing Hamdan, Breyer explained why the Court should not refrain from
hearing a consolidated set of detainee challenges even if available remedies have not
yet been exhausted:
185
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be resolved in accordance with legal principles as
conventionally understood, rather than how these principles
might eventually change to adapt to new factual landscapes,
such as major military or political developments spurred by the
war on terror.187 Disposition outside of this traditional law-ofwar paradigm thus may be appropriate when (but not until)
circumstances have altered such that they are incompatible
with the expectations that informed the existing legal
framework, in particular that a war will not endure
perpetually.188
2. Application of the Restricted Temporal Vantage
Point to the Facts of Hamdi
Applying the foregoing logic to the specific context in
Hamdi, the plurality assessed from a present factual and legal
perspective whether the AUMF had authorized the detention of
an alleged enemy combatant held outside the civilian criminal
system and who had not been charged with any crimes.189 The
plurality, accordingly, did not consider the possibility, though
not “far-fetched,” that Hamdi’s detention might last
perpetually (that is, for the detainee’s entire life), rather than
just indefinitely (that is, for an uncertain period of time).190 The
plurality similarly declined to adjudge the present dispute in
accordance with some hypothetical legal rubric under which
the law of war had evolved to accommodate the yet unrealized
prospect of perpetual detention.191 Invoking a sense of
Here, as in Hamdan, petitioners argue that the tribunals to which they have
already been subjected were infirm (by, inter alia, denying Petitioners
counsel and access to evidence). Here, as in Hamdan, petitioners assert that
these procedural infirmities cannot be corrected by review under the DTA
which provides for no augmentation of the record on appeal and, as noted
above, will provide no remedy for any constitutional violation. Here, as in
Hamdan, petitioners have a compelling interest in assuring in advance that
the procedures to which they are subject are lawful.
Boumediene, 127 S. Ct. at 1481 (citations omitted). Finally, Breyer noted that “here,
unlike Hamdan, the military tribunals in Guantanamo have completed their
work . . . .” Id. (emphasis in original). With this last statement (especially when read in
light of Part II of the concurrence), Breyer seems to imply that if expedited review were
warranted in Hamdan, then, a fortiori, so too would it be here. See id.
187
See infra Part III.A.2.
188
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (O’Connor, J., plurality
opinion).
189
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516-24 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
190
See id. at 519-20.
191
See id. at 521; infra notes 203-204 and accompanying text.
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uncertainty regarding both factual and legal developments, the
plurality thus avoided reviewing the legality of a current
situation in light of unknown future scenarios.
In considering whether the AUMF had authorized the
detention of alleged enemy combatants who had been captured
abroad during hostilities, the plurality distinguished, as a
factual matter, between indefinite and perpetual detention.192
The plurality recognized that longstanding law-of-war
principles permit the detention of enemy combatants for the
duration of hostilities but no longer.193 Hence, although Hamdi’s
detention was indefinite, it was limited definitively by the
happening of a particular occasion—the endpoint of
hostilities.194 But the plurality also realized that, due to the
“unconventional” nature of the war on terror and the
corresponding possibility that the constituent conflicts could
last for multiple generations, there was a reasonable prospect
of effectively permanent detention (which, in terms of duration,
rose beyond the level of mere uncertainty).195
Nonetheless, the plurality did not deem this
indefinite/perpetual distinction relevant to evaluating the
legality of Hamdi’s detention under matters as they currently
stood. The “necessary and appropriate force” authorized by the
AUMF, according to the plurality, fundamentally included the
traditional law-of-war principle mentioned above.196 Therefore,
so long as active combat persisted in Afghanistan, as was the
case when the Court reviewed Hamdi’s habeas petition,197
durational indefiniteness did not strip a detention of its
legality.198 By that same measure, the prospect of a detention
192

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521; see also supra note 190 and accompanying text.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518-20 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
194
See id. at 520; see also Rotunda, supra note 44, at 31 (noting that “history
did not give the ‘Thirty Years War’ that label on year one, or even year 29” and that
“the ‘Seven Years War,’ or the ‘Seven Days War’ are names that the historians gave to
these wars after they ended, not when they started”). The foregoing assertion rests on
the assumption that the government would actually comply with the law of war.
195
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519-20 (2004) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion); see also
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 57, at 2077 (arguing that the notion of executive
aggrandizement “acquires enhanced resonance when one imagines that an
extraordinary, emergency-based validation of executive detentions might endure
throughout a metaphorical war with no currently imaginable end”) (emphasis added).
196
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518-19 (“Because detention to prevent a
combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war . . .,
Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow
circumstances considered here.”).
197
See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
198
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
193
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enduring in perpetuity did not fall outside the scope of
authorization provided by the AUMF.199
Regardless of the probability that Hamdi’s detention
would last decades or beyond, the fact is that over 13,000 U.S.
troops remained in Afghanistan at the time of the Court’s
review.200 This substantial, active military presence easily
satisfies the definition of hostilities under the traditional law of
war.201 It follows that Hamdi’s detention, within the proper
scope of the AUMF, could be directly linked to the ongoing
state of conflict.202 In sum, even a detention characterized as
perpetual could be resolved by reference to present
circumstances and in accordance with longstanding law-of-war
principles.
The plurality, however, did suggest that a federal court
might have occasion to reconsider the legal significance of
perpetual and even indefinite detention if the war on terror
proved radically different from the “practical circumstances” on
which traditional law-of-war principles (and, in turn, the
“necessary and appropriate force” provision in the AUMF) were
based.203 But rather than explicitly defining an unprecedented
conflict, the plurality referred to such a conflict by negative
example (that is, in terms of what it was not), using the current
conflict in Afghanistan as an illustration.204
Again, despite the unconventionality of the conflict in
Afghanistan and despite the likelihood of the lifelong
confinement of at least some of the persons detained, the
plurality firmly held that this conflict should be categorized
within the conventional law-of-war framework.205 This conflict
seemed traditional not only inasmuch as that the United States

199

See id.
See id. (noting reports of over 13,000, and perhaps as many as 20,000, U.S.
troops in Afghanistan (citing Pamela Constable, U.S. Launches New Operation in
Afghanistan, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2004, at A22; General John Abizaid Central
Command Operations Update Briefing, Dept. of Defense, (Apr. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040430-1402.html)); see also Rotunda,
supra note 44, at 32 (noting that while it is not clear “when the Afghanistan hostilities .
. . will end,” it is “certain that they have not yet ended” given the continual military
activity).
201
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
202
See id.
203
See id. (“If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely
unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that
understanding may unravel. But that is not the situation we face as of this date.”).
204
See id.
205
See supra notes 200-202 and accompanying text.
200
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maintained a significant troop presence in Afghanistan,206 but
also in that only a relatively short time had elapsed (less than
three years) since the American invasion commenced.207 As
implied by the plurality, this period was insufficient for the law
of war to have begun to “unravel.”208 It may also be reasonably
surmised from this opinion that the troop level and time period
considerations, when taken together, militated against application of a modified law-of-war framework, even if either
consideration alone might not.209

B.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Anticipatory Review
1. The General Approach of the Hamdan Court

Unlike the plurality in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld reviewed the merits of a detainee
challenge notwithstanding that the circumstances at issue had
not yet fully occurred or developed.210 The Hamdan Court
followed an approach less temporally prescribed than that in
Hamdi, whereby the evident strength of the merits of a habeas
petition, or extraordinary surrounding circumstances, could
warrant a “peremptory” review on the merits. If there were a
reasonable basis to presume that the government would not
afford to an alleged enemy combatant traditional legal and
judicial protections, the reviewing federal court could take
preemptive action in the name of the public interest.211
According to the Hamdan Court, the weighty legal questions
presented by the claims at issue justified the extension of an
equitable-like jurisdiction over these claims—or, in a sense,
infused them with ripeness.212 The Court, however, did not
always clearly differentiate between formal threshold
206

See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
Hamdi was decided in June 2004, Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507, whereas the
United States invasion of Afghanistan commenced in October 2001, President George
W. Bush, Presidential Address to Announce Attacks on Afghanistan (television
broadcast Oct. 7, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.australianpolitics.com/news/
2001/01-10-07.shtml).
208
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
209
But, as John Yoo notes, the plurality did not actually give “any reason why
[even] after two generations it may be necessary to reconsider the laws of war,” so long
as “American troops remain engaged in combat.” Yoo, supra note 58, at 583.
210
See supra Part III.A.
211
See infra Part III.B.2 Contrast this approach with that employed in
Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006); see also supra note 186.
212
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
207
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conclusions and additional non-binding rationales, or between
the former and ultimate substantive conclusions (that is, on the
merits). Instead, as with Rasul, the Hamdan Court seemed to
inject merits and dicta into its preliminary analysis.213
2. Anticipatory Review as Applied to the Specific
Dispute in Hamdan
Applying the approach described above, the Hamdan
Court declined to abstain from reviewing Hamdan’s procedural
challenge to the military commission set to try him in advance
of a final decision by the commission.214 In rebutting the
government’s contention that the Court should decline to
address Hamdan’s procedural challenge even if the Court had
statutory jurisdiction over this challenge, the Court cited
several structural and procedural differences between trial by
military commission and trial by court-martial (and civilian
court, by extension).215 The Court’s conclusion that this
challenge was essentially ripe for review on the merits in part
attested to the substantial likelihood that the commission
procedures would violate the law.216 In other part, the Court
appealed to a sense of uncertainty regarding the fate of
Hamdan and future actions by the commission and executive
branch.217 Plausible grounds existed, in short, for presuming
that Hamdan would be denied traditional legal and judicial
protections. The profound liberty interests ostensibly at stake
supported the extension of jurisdiction over a dispute involving
only partially developed circumstances.218

213

See supra Parts I.D., II.B.
See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
215
See infra Part III.B.2.a-b.
216
See infra Part III.B.2.b.
217
See infra Part III.B.2
218
See supra note 106 and accompanying text. For a discussion of a different
type of “anticipatory” response in the war-on-terror context, see Robert M. Chesney,
Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated
Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 427 (2007) (discussing policy implications of recent
trend of “early stage anticipatory [criminal] prosecution” of suspected terrorists by
federal government). Chesney notes that “military” alternatives to traditional
prosecutorial approaches have become less attractive in light of persistent legal
uncertainty regarding the legality of military detention, related political pressure, and
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan. Id. at 432-33, 433 n.24. The subsequent
passage of the MCA, however, may mitigate the negative influence of that decision. See
supra note 104.
214
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a. Structural Deficiencies
In rejecting the argument that abstention was
warranted in light of comity considerations, the Hamdan Court
emphasized the significant structural dissimilarities between
the military commission, a creature of the executive branch,
and court-martial, a congressional creation.219 In particular, the
appeals mechanism of convictions by the commission rests not
with the civilian judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces, as it does with courts-martial, but with a panel
of “military officers designated by the Secretary of Defense,”
review of which panel’s decision can “be had only to the
Secretary of Defense himself, and then, finally, to the
President.”220
This Executive-appointed panel, moreover, had been
formed specifically to review the decisions of commissions set to
try alleged enemy combatants like Hamdan.221 Review of
Hamdan’s procedural challenge thus could be subject to
substantial structural military influence, even if not
deliberately exerted.222
According to the Court, the fact that Hamdan (at least
as matters currently stood) was not automatically entitled to
habeas review by a civilian court under the DTA further
militated against abstention on the basis of inter-court or even
inter-branch comity in this exceptional case.223
The Court preferred to provide a momentously
important, though still developing, case with immediate review
by a civilian court (which, under the circumstances, was the
Supreme Court itself) rather than to defer to an uncertain
review by a civilian court following the outcome of the military
commission or to a potentially compromised executive-branch

219

See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2771 (2006) (citations omitted)
(citing Dept. of Defense Military Comm’n Order No. 1, § 6(H)(4)-(6) (Mar. 21, 2002)
(last amended, as of the time of this case, on Aug. 31, 2005)). The Court noted later in
its opinion that under the DTA the President had full discretion over the timing of the
final decision of the commission. Id. at 2788. In this way, the Hamdan Court, unlike
the Hamdi plurality, considered as legally relevant the prospect of uncertainly
prolonged detention. See supra Part III.A.2.
221
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2760.
222
See id. at 2771-72.
223
See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2771. Review of the final decision as such,
under the DTA, would lie at the discretion of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. Id.
220
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review.224 In simpler terms, but for the Court’s current review,
Hamdan’s procedural challenge potentially would go unheard
or, alternatively, be heard by a less than impartial body.
The Hamdan Court, as the foregoing discussion
demonstrates, suggests that the military commission
implicated vital issues beyond the specific procedural context of
Hamdan’s challenge,225 including separation of powers and the
availability of structural judicial protections. Whereas the
Padilla Court expansively defined the traditional habeas
framework to include even challenges arising in the war-onterror context so as to reduce the judicial docket,226 the Hamdan
Court narrowly construed the concepts of comity and deference
to expedite judicial review of (still-developing) cases by Article
III courts where the executive branch had attempted to
diminish traditional judicial protections.
Although the Hamdan Court concluded that the
Councilman comity doctrine technically did not apply under
the circumstances,227 it also seemed to conclude that the
important substantive attributes of the case overrode any
consideration of inter-court or inter-branch comity.228 As a
baseline matter, given that Councilman did not apply, the
latter conclusion (regarding the overriding substantive
attributes of the case) probably should be viewed as dictum.
But it is not clear that the formal, technical conclusion has
stand-alone value apart from the substantive attributes of the
case, considering the profound significance ascribed to these
attributes and the manner in which they were emphasized.
Rather, as in Rasul, the Hamdan Court purported to reach a
self-contained, uncomplicated threshold conclusion, but
resorted to the merits of the case to give this formal
determination appreciable value.229
b. Procedural Deficiencies
As described in the preceding subsection, the Court
rejected comity considerations as a reason for abstaining from
reviewing Hamdan’s procedural challenge in advance of a final
224
225
226
227
228
229

See id. at 2771-72.
See infra Part III.B.2.b.
See supra Part II.A.3.
See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.2.
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determination by the military commission. The Court, in like
manner, did not abstain from early review on the basis that
there were no grounds for presuming the illegality of the
commission procedures prior to the commencement of
Hamdan’s trial.230 On the contrary, the governing procedures
not only were described with “particularity” in the government
order establishing the commission, but some of them already
had been implemented as of the time of the Court’s review.231
Both Hamdan and the government, the Court concluded, “ha[d]
a compelling interest in knowing in advance whether Hamdan
[could] be tried by a military commission that . . . operate[d]
free from many of the procedural rules prescribed by Congress
for courts-martial—rules intended to safeguard the accused
and ensure the reliability of any conviction.”232
Indeed, Hamdan alleged that he would be and “already
ha[d] been,” excluded from his own trial.233 The Court, in a
sense, justified its anticipatory review of the dispute by virtue
of the premise that the commission procedures had actively
informed the current reality of the case. The circumstances
that Hamdan challenged were not just based on some far-off
possibility (like perpetual detention as understood by the
Hamdi plurality).234
“Another striking feature” of the governing procedures
noted by the Court was the admissibility of any evidence with
probative value, as determined by the presiding officer.235
Admissible evidence could potentially include testimonial
hearsay, unsworn live testimony and statements, as well as
coercively induced evidence.236
These procedural deficiencies can be compared to the
structural deficiencies of the commission’s review process237 to
the extent that both contributed to the one-sidedness of the
military commission in favor of the government. Both types
also widened the degree of separation between the commissions
230

See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2787-88 (2006).
Id. at 2788.
232
Id. at 2772; see also infra note 236 and accompanying text.
233
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2788. Even though any proceedings closed to
Hamdan would have to be attended by an appointed military counsel, the presiding
officer at his discretion could forbid this counsel from disclosing to Hamdan the events
occurring therein. Id. at 2786.
234
See supra Part III.A.2.
235
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786.
236
Id.
237
See supra Part III.B.2.a.
231

688

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:2

and courts-martial in terms of judicial access and internal
protections.
Yet the Court’s aggressive treatment of the subject of
the presumption of illegality might give a false impression that
deviations in the procedures governing military commissions
from those governing courts-martial were per se illegal. Rather,
the legality of these deviations turned on whether the
procedures governing military commissions and courts-martial
were “uniform insofar as practicable” per the UCMJ.238
Later, in its formal assessments of the merits of
Hamdan’s procedural challenge, the Court concluded that the
government had not satisfied this uniformity requirement
because it had not adequately demonstrated that it would not
have been feasible, due to exigencies arising in the theater of
war, to apply the rules governing trials by courts-martial to
Hamdan’s trial.239 Viewing the concept of military necessity in a
strict logistical (as opposed to strategic) sense,240 the Court
found that it was simply not evident that the government
would suffer any undue hardship by following the traditional
rules regarding the admissibility and authentication of
evidence.241 Similarly, the “jettisoning” of a person’s basic right
to be present at his own trial was not sufficiently tailored to the
threat to national security posed by international terrorism.242
In turn, the Court’s conclusion that grounds existed for
presuming the illegality of the commission procedures
depended on this same basic determination (that the
commission procedures did not comply with the UCMJ
uniformity requirement). To an appreciable (albeit backward)
extent, the Hamdan Court thus incorporated in its analysis the
merits of the case when determining whether to formally
review these very same merits. Stated differently, in a
sequentially reverse process, the Court’s ultimate substantive
holding significantly informed its earlier threshold
determination.
Even if such merits-based review could be justified in
light of Hamdan’s allegation that some of the commission
238
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2000) (“All rules
and regulations made under this article shall be uniform insofar as practicable and
shall be reported to Congress”)). But see infra note 244 and accompanying text.
239
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2792-93.
240
See id. at 2792.
241
See id.
242
See id.
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procedures had already been implemented, the Court did not
proceed to limit its substantive review to only those
procedures.243 Additionally, incorporating the merits of the case
into the threshold determination perhaps could be justified if
the correct application of the UCMJ uniformity test had been
undisputed and unequivocal, which it ostensibly was not, and if
the Court’s interpretation of this test had been devoid of
idiosyncrasy, which it likewise was not.244 It is therefore
difficult to find in Hamdan the sort of meaningful separation
between threshold and substantive considerations that had
been championed by the Court in Padilla.245 It instead appears
that the Hamdan Court, perhaps quietly drawing inspiration
from Rasul, indirectly sanctioned a form of anticipatory review
over the merits of this detainee challenge.246
3. Comparing Hamdan to Hamdi
With respect to the issue of anticipatory review, the
relative expansiveness of the Hamdan approach, as described
above, conflicted in material respects with the more temporally
restricted vantage point employed by the Hamdi plurality.247
Whereas the Hamdi plurality settled for a position of judicial
restraint, the Hamdan Court essentially espoused a breed of
judicial activism. Hamdan, moreover, justified its expeditious
review on the basis of resolving the significant legal
controversies engendered by this case and facilitating closure
on the subject. By contrast, the Hamdi plurality preferred to
243
To the contrary, the Court proceeded to assess the legality of the military
commission as a whole on the basis of select governing procedures. See id. at 2853
(Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that “[i]f Congress enacted a statute requiring the federal
district courts to follow a procedure that is unconstitutional, the statute would be
invalid, but the district courts would not.” By that same logic, even assuming the
impropriety of some of the commission procedures, “the appropriate remedy is to
proscribe the use of those particular procedures, not to outlaw the commission[].”).
244
Substantial disagreement within the Court itself tends to demonstrate that
the uniformity test was far from settled waters. See id. at 2842 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“Nothing in the text of Article 36(b) [of the UCMJ] supports the Court’s sweeping
conclusion that it represents an unprecedented congressional effort to change the
nature of military commissions . . . to tribunals that must presumptively function like
courts-martial. . . . The vision of uniformity that motivated the adoption of the
UCMJ . . . is nothing more than uniformity across the separate branches of the armed
services.” (referring to 10 U.S.C. § 836(b))); see also id. at 2852 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with the Court’s holding that the “military commission is ‘illegal,’ because
its procedures allegedly do not comply with 10 U.S.C. § 836”).
245
See supra Part II.A.
246
See supra Part II.B.
247
See supra Part III.A.

690

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:2

let matters develop more naturally and not to ascribe legal
significance to presumptions, even if reasonably grounded.
Still, these cases did not flatly contradict each other, and
differing contexts may in part explain any divergence.
Significantly, the Hamdi plurality was confronted with
a prospect (lifelong detention) that, even if reasonably
foreseeable, is subject to innumerable military and political
developments. Reviewing the legality of a detention in light of
this prospect would require a certain degree of prescience,
which arguably fell outside the judiciary’s ordinary sphere of
competence.248 The realization of this prospect, at any rate,
technically would comply with the traditional law of war
insofar as the detention tracked continual hostilities.249 The law
of war could eventually adapt to accommodate novel factual
circumstances, but, again, the plurality could not predict any
such changes with legitimate confidence. For similar reasons,
the Court should not prognosticate with regard to how the law
might respond to reflect these factual developments, including
the effective reality of permanent detention, at least not when
only a relatively short period of time (three years from the
plurality’s vantage point) had elapsed since the relevant
military campaign began.
By contrast, the Hamdan Court stood in a more selfcontained universe, one where the legality of future scenarios
turned predominantly on a previously established set of
written instructions, even some that had already been
implemented. Furthermore, the procedures governing the
military commission, which the government had documented in
248
See Yoo, supra note 58, at 590-601. With specific reference to the war on
terror, Yoo discusses how federal courts, comparatively speaking, are institutionally
incompetent to address foreign policy disputes at both micro and macro levels. See id.
According to Yoo, the judiciary, “[r]ather than ask[ing] itself whether it can balance
security against liberty interests . . . ought to ask itself whether the [political] branches
could strike a better balance based on more informed judgment.” Id. at 601. In a
similar vein, several scholars, including Yoo, have envisioned the judicial/political
power struggle in administrative law (or quasi-administrative law) terms. See, e.g., id.
at 600-01, 601 n.141 (suggesting that federal courts, in contributing to “terrorism
policy . . . might adopt the deference afforded to executive agency decision making
under . . . Chevron” (referring to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984) (courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of facially
ambiguous or inconclusive controlling statutes))); Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein,
Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1178, 1220-26 (2007)
(describing Supreme Court’s failure to apply Chevron-like deference or analysis in both
Hamdi and Hamdan as “a puzzling and important omission”). Indeed, it has become
rather trendy for an article addressing separation of powers and foreign policy issues to
make at least one Chevron reference.
249
See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
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detail, apparently would not comply with the UCMJ (nor the
Geneva Conventions) as matters currently stood.250 The Court,
accordingly, could limit any conjecturing on its part.251 Plus, if
the Court had declined to act when it did, the detainee
Hamdan potentially would have been foreclosed from an
opportunity for a civilian court to review his challenge.252
Reviewing trial procedures for compliance with a statutory
requirement, moreover, arguably fell well within the abilities of
a federal court, even if the government had not yet fully
implemented those procedures.253
But even in light of these contextual differences, Hamdi
and Hamdan at best submit to a partial jurisprudential
reconciliation with regard to the issue of anticipatory review.
In particular, Hamdi restricted its analysis to a traditional,
well-established legal framework,254 whereas Hamdan not only
adopted an evidently controversial interpretation of a
complicated military code, but essentially based this
interpretation on the relative equities of the case.255 The
differences in these cases thus cannot just be rationalized as
that in one case but not the other grounds existed to presume
250

See supra notes 112-114, 238-242 and accompanying text.
Even still, a viable argument can be made against judicial competency in
this area given the inextricable, underlying (or even overlying) foreign policy
considerations. But it is arguable that the Court was at least somewhat more
competent here than in Hamdi—as previously described—within the meaning of
“competency” as understood by John Yoo. See supra note 248.
252
See supra notes 223-224 and accompanying text.
253
Review for compliance with international law perhaps less arguably fell
within this realm, but such review in this case nonetheless would involve an actual
document (i.e., the Geneva Conventions) and thus a relatively self-contained vantage
point from which to proceed.
For an interesting discussion of the litigation strategies employed by
Hamdan’s legal team, see Katyal, supra note 44, at 72-105. For instance, Hamdan’s
legal team, which included Katyal, sought to emphasize in oral arguments before the
Supreme Court that striking down the military commission set to try Hamdan would
only minimally interfere with the Executive Branch, given that no military commission
trials had taken place in over half a century. Id. at 92-93. The Court thus would only be
preserving “the status quo,” id. at 93, which, as a practical matter, is generally an
attractive option. Additionally, Hamdan and similarly situated defendants were being
detained indefinitely, so there would be no major, immediate change in their statuses
resulting from a decision striking down the military commissions. Id. Moreover,
following the Court’s decision, there was always the possibility of congressional (as
opposed to unilateral Executive) endorsement of a military commission scheme. Id. By
contrast, legislative correction of a decision favoring the government would not come
easy due to the likelihood of a presidential veto and the near impossibility of obtaining
a supermajority vote in the “tight political party environment.” Id. at 95. In sum, there
was no compelling reason to find for the government, and not finding for Hamdan could
have detrimental, practically irreversible consequences.
254
See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
255
See supra notes 238-246 and accompanying text.
251
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the illegality of a future scenario. To do so trivializes the
substantively different values and rationales underlying the
respective determinations in these cases.
C.

A Divided Jurisprudence

The major discrepancies between the temporal vantage
points applied by the Hamdi plurality and Hamdan Court
further added to the inconsistencies in the Supreme Court’s
post-9/11 war-on-terror jurisprudence. Viewing these cases in
conjunction with Rumsfeld v. Padilla and Rasul v. Bush, it
becomes apparent that the Court has struggled to determine
the extent to which it should review on the merits detainee
challenges or particular elements thereof. The Padilla Court
and Hamdi plurality selected a relatively narrow framework
and favored the accessible over the distant.256 By contrast, the
Rasul and Hamdan Courts resorted to, or effectively condoned,
the incorporation of more subjective factors into threshold
analyses.257
The overall trend probably leans toward the latter, more
expansive approach, at least when considering the extent to
which the Court in Hamdan, the most recent of these detainee
challenges, appeared to consider the exceptional surrounding
circumstances in assessing whether and to what extent to
review this dispute on the merits. But even if this emerging
trend makes the war-on-terror jurisprudence more predictable
in one sense, it has occurred in a relatively unstable manner.
For this reason it is difficult to extract from these trendsetters
(if Rasul and Hamdan may be labeled as such) any readily
applicable formulas.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s post-9/11 war-on-terror jurisprudence has been characterized by inconsistencies with regard to
the proper boundary between threshold determinations and the
substantive attributes of a federal detainee challenge, and also
with regard to the appropriate scope of the temporal
perspective from which issues should be assessed. Despite
these general inconsistencies, the emerging trend, as evidenced
by Rasul and Hamdan, has favored affording special treatment
256
257

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Parts II.B, III.B.
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to detainee challenges at the threshold level in light of the
remarkable surrounding circumstances or the important
security/liberty debate embodied by these cases.258 But
providing such treatment necessarily entails normative
judgment about what constitutes “exceptionality” or
“profundity.”259 To an extent then, the Court has endorsed the
role of federal courts as arbiters of the public interest.
Stated more positively, the Court has placed traditional
legal and judicial guarantees in a higher realm than
considerations of military logistics, even prior to formally
reviewing a detainee challenge on the merits. Yet this
preference too requires making a distinction between actual
exigency and mere strategy. This distinction, furthermore, in
large part turns on the particular circumstances of a detainee
challenge, such as the duration of the detention and the extent
and nature of judicial process afforded to detainees.
Consequently, the important substantive attributes of a
detainee challenge, as perceived by a court, may militate
against a finding of military necessity, even against the
backdrop of the threat of international terrorism.260 From this
same perspective, the major personal liberties implicated by
government action may even demand an expedited meritsbased review.
This author does not doubt the potential societal
significance inherent to detainee challenges arising from the
war on terror. Nonetheless, the Court should scale back the
expansive approach to threshold issues that it adopted in Rasul
and Hamdan. This approach requires, at a preliminary stage,
extensive ad hoc determinations regarding the worth of a case.
The resulting absence of baseline standards contributes to
uncertainty “in an area where certainty is called for.”261
But the current situation may be still trickier than this,
given the relative instability with which the Court, as in Rasul
and Hamdi, has ascribed to an activist position.262 Indirectly
considering the momentousness of a detainee challenge when
determining threshold issues implicates the same basic
problems described above. If anything, the resulting confusion
258

See supra Parts II.B, III.B.
See supra Part II.A.3.
260
See supra notes 238-242.
261
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 495 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
supra note 168.
262
See supra Parts II.B, III.B.
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reflects the practical difficulty of incorporating special
circumstances into the legal analysis. The terms “merits-creep”
and “dicta-creep” are perhaps overly simplistic, but they
concisely describe certain insidious jurisprudential tendencies.
Clearer judicial analysis in detainee challenges—
without creative synergizing of threshold determinations and
substantive attributes and without conflation of merits and
dicta—may in time obviate and replace the language of “creep.”
Clear statutory language, whose plain meaning avoids
constitutional concerns, could also help undo the damage left
by the Court in the first five years following 9/11. But the
Supreme Court (or, less abstractly, the interpretive methods of
the individual Justices) is not completely beholden to, but
rather to some degree transcends, the particular statutory or
political contexts in which a detainee challenge arises.
Currently on the Court’s war-on-terror, detaineechallenge docket is Boumediene v. Bush.263 Will the Court
turn over a new leaf in the second five years following 9/11,
opting for a more stable course and straightening out the
inconsistencies in the process? Unlike the Court in Hamdan,264
and more like the plurality in Hamdi,265 this author will refrain
from speculating (just yet).
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This case actually does appear to be correctly poised for a direct
constitutional ruling, see supra note 104, though there are probably different ways in
which such a ruling can be framed. For descriptions of other terrorism-related cases
that the Court has agreed to hear, see Facts on File, Supreme Court; Cases Accepted of
Americans Held in Iraq; Other Developments, WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Dec. 13, 2007.
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See supra Part III.B.
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See supra Part III.A.
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